## Facts

- In 2023, a federal grand jury indicted former President Donald J. Trump on four federal counts arising from conduct while he was in office after the 2020 presidential election.
- The indictment alleged that after losing the election, Trump conspired to overturn the result by making knowingly false claims of election fraud and using those claims to attempt to change the outcome.
- The indictment grouped alleged conduct into several areas, including: (1) discussions with Justice Department officials urging investigations and public statements about supposed election crimes to persuade states to replace legitimate electors; (2) efforts to persuade the Vice President to use his role at the January 6 electoral-vote certification proceeding to reject or delay counting legitimate electoral votes; (3) communications with state officials, private actors, and the public to advance fraud claims and encourage steps that would change states’ electoral votes; and (4) public statements, including tweets and a speech, encouraging supporters to go to the Capitol on January 6 to pressure the Vice President during certification.
- Trump moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that a former President has constitutional immunity from federal criminal prosecution for official acts taken while in office and that the charged conduct fell within his official responsibilities.
- The federal district court denied the motion, concluding former Presidents do not have absolute federal criminal immunity for acts committed while in office.
- The D.C. Circuit affirmed, rejecting Trump’s claimed immunity.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari on whether, and to what extent, a former President enjoys immunity from federal criminal prosecution for conduct alleged to involve official acts during his tenure.

## Issues

1. Whether, and to what extent, a former President has constitutional immunity from federal criminal prosecution for conduct alleged to involve official acts taken while in office.
2. What categories of presidential conduct receive (a) absolute immunity, (b) presumptive immunity, or (c) no immunity.
3. What method courts must use to classify alleged conduct as “official” or “unofficial,” and how immunity should be handled in pretrial proceedings.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court vacated the D.C. Circuit’s judgment in part and remanded for further proceedings.
- The Court held that a former President has absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for actions within the President’s “conclusive and preclusive” constitutional authority.
- The Court held that a former President has at least presumptive immunity from criminal prosecution for all other official acts.
- The Court held that there is no immunity for unofficial acts.
- The Court instructed that courts must separate official from unofficial conduct and then apply the proper level of immunity to the official conduct before any criminal case may proceed based on it.
- Applying those principles, the Court concluded that the alleged conduct involving Trump’s communications with Justice Department officials concerned executive branch investigative and prosecutorial functions and therefore fell within the President’s exclusive authority; Trump was absolutely immune from prosecution for that conduct.
- The Court treated Trump’s alleged communications with the Vice President about the certification proceeding as at least plausibly official and therefore subject to presumptive immunity, leaving it to the district court on remand to apply the presumption and determine whether prosecution for that official conduct would pose risks of interference with executive branch functions.
- For other alleged conduct—such as dealings with state officials, private parties, and public messaging—the Court did not finally classify each allegation and directed the district court to conduct an allegation-by-allegation analysis to decide what is official, what is unofficial, and what may be used in a prosecution consistent with immunity.

## Legal Principles

- Presidential immunity from criminal prosecution is derived from separation of powers and the need to protect the independence of the Executive Branch from control through criminal process directed at a President’s official conduct.
- Absolute criminal immunity applies to presidential actions within the President’s exclusive (“conclusive and preclusive”) constitutional authority; courts may not impose criminal liability for such acts.
- For all other official acts within the outer perimeter of presidential responsibilities, a former President has at least presumptive criminal immunity; the presumption may be overcome only where applying criminal law would not create risks of interference with executive branch authority and functions.
- No immunity applies to unofficial conduct, including acts taken in a private or political capacity rather than as an exercise of governmental power.
- Whether conduct is official turns on the nature of the act and the office’s responsibilities, not on a prosecutor’s or court’s assessment of the President’s motives.
- Immunity questions must be addressed early, and the district court must sort the indictment’s allegations into official and unofficial conduct before allowing the prosecution to proceed based on official acts.
- On remand, courts must determine not only whether particular conduct is immune, but also how immunity limits the prosecution’s use of immune official acts in the case.

## Conclusion

In Trump v. United States, the Supreme Court rejected a categorical rule that former Presidents may be prosecuted for all acts taken while in office and instead adopted a tiered approach: absolute immunity for acts within the President’s exclusive constitutional authority, presumptive immunity for other official acts, and no immunity for unofficial conduct. The Court vacated the D.C. Circuit’s decision and sent the case back for the district court to classify the indictment’s allegations act by act and decide which portions, if any, may proceed under the Court’s separation-of-powers standards.


Trump v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 2312 (2024)