## Facts

- John F. Trzecki, III sued David and Steven Gruenewald in Missouri for personal injuries from an automobile incident occurring near Springfield, Illinois.
- All parties were Missouri residents; the trip was intended to begin and end in Missouri, and both vehicles were licensed and garaged in Missouri.
- After the vehicle Trzecki rode in became inoperative in Illinois, David summoned Steven to tow the car; during the tow trip Steven’s car overturned, injuring Trzecki.
- The accident occurred June 23, 1970; the suit was filed November 20, 1972.
- Illinois law included (1) a guest statute allowing recovery by a guest passenger only for the driver’s willful and wanton misconduct and (2) a two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions.
- Missouri law included a borrowing statute, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.190, making a foreign limitations bar a complete defense in Missouri if the action is fully barred where it “originated.”
- Trzecki’s petition did not plead willful and wanton misconduct.

## Issues

1. For Missouri’s borrowing statute, did the tort claim “originate” in Illinois such that Illinois limitations law governed?
2. Can a plaintiff avoid the borrowing statute by pleading ordinary negligence (omitting willful-and-wanton allegations required by the foreign guest statute) and characterizing the claim as arising under Missouri common law?
3. Does Missouri’s borrowing statute apply only to suits involving nonresident plaintiffs, or also when all parties are Missouri residents?

## Decision

- The Missouri Supreme Court held the cause of action originated in Illinois because the injury and alleged wrongful conduct occurred there.
- The court held Missouri’s borrowing statute is not limited to nonresident plaintiffs; it applies regardless of the parties’ residence.
- The court rejected the attempt to defeat the borrowing statute through pleading choices that omit elements required under the foreign substantive law.
- The court concluded the trial court’s dismissal based on a straightforward limitations calculation was incorrect because the “fully barred” inquiry under § 516.190 required a more careful analysis of Illinois law’s operation in the circumstances.

## Legal Principles

- Under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.190, a Missouri court looks to the state where the cause of action originated to determine whether the claim is fully barred there; if so, that bar is a complete defense in Missouri.
- In tort cases, a cause of action “originates” in the state where the injury and alleged tortious conduct occur.
- A plaintiff cannot change the place of origin, or avoid application of the borrowing statute, by framing the claim under Missouri common law or omitting foreign-law elements (including guest-statute requirements).
- The borrowing statute’s application does not turn on whether the parties are Missouri residents; the statutory text focuses on origin, not domicile.

## Conclusion

The court treated the Illinois accident as the claim’s origin for borrowing-statute purposes and applied § 516.190 without regard to the parties’ Missouri residency, rejecting pleading strategies meant to obtain Missouri’s longer limitations period while requiring a proper determination of whether Illinois law fully barred the claim.


Trzecki v. Gruenewald, 532 S.W.2d 209 (Mo. 1976)