## Facts

- California’s capital scheme makes a defendant death-eligible upon a first-degree murder conviction plus at least one statutorily defined “special circumstance”; the case then proceeds to a penalty phase where the jury chooses death or life without parole using listed sentencing factors.
- Petitioners challenged three penalty-phase factors in California Penal Code § 190.3: (a) circumstances of the crime and special circumstances, (b) prior violent criminal activity, and (i) defendant’s age at the time of the crime.
- Paul Palalau Tuilaepa participated in an armed robbery of a Long Beach bar in 1986, during which he shot multiple patrons, killing one; a jury convicted him of first-degree murder, found a robbery-murder special circumstance true, and imposed a death sentence after the penalty phase.
- William Arnold Proctor entered a schoolteacher’s home at night in 1982, assaulted and killed her during a burglary that involved sexual assault; he was convicted of first-degree murder with special circumstances and sentenced to death after a penalty phase.
- The California Supreme Court affirmed both death sentences; the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the cases to consider the Eighth Amendment vagueness challenge to the three penalty factors.

## Issues

1. Whether California Penal Code § 190.3 factors (a) (circumstances of the crime/special circumstances), (b) (prior violent criminal activity), and (i) (age) are unconstitutionally vague under the Eighth Amendment.
2. Whether California’s penalty-phase “selection” process provides constitutionally sufficient guidance to the sentencer.

## Decision

- The Court affirmed the judgments upholding both death sentences.
- The Court held that § 190.3 factors (a), (b), and (i) are not unconstitutionally vague.
- The Court distinguished the “eligibility” stage (which must narrow the class of death-eligible offenders) from the “selection” stage (which permits broader consideration of relevant aggravating and mitigating evidence).
- The Court concluded that each challenged factor has an understandable, common-sense meaning that jurors can apply to the historical facts of the offense and defendant.

## Legal Principles

- Capital sentencing has two constitutional tasks: (1) narrowing death eligibility through objective criteria and (2) selecting among eligible defendants based on individualized sentencing considerations.
- At the selection stage, Eighth Amendment vagueness review is more deferential; a factor is valid if it has a “common-sense core of meaning” that jurors can understand and apply.
- A factor directing the jury to consider the circumstances of the offense and any found special circumstances is sufficiently definite because it focuses the jury on concrete facts of the crime and established findings.
- A factor directing the jury to consider prior criminal activity involving force, attempted force, or threats of force is sufficiently definite because it addresses specific, fact-based conduct.
- A factor directing the jury to consider the defendant’s age is not vague merely because age may be viewed as mitigating or aggravating depending on the case; difficulty in weighing a factor is not the same as unconstitutional indeterminacy.

## Conclusion

The Court upheld California’s capital penalty-phase factors addressing the circumstances of the crime, prior violent criminal activity, and the defendant’s age, holding that selection-stage factors satisfy the Eighth Amendment if they convey an intelligible, common-sense meaning and allow the jury to make an individualized sentencing judgment after eligibility has been properly narrowed.


Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967 (1994)