## Facts

- Robert E. Turner, III developed the Windermere subdivision and recorded a declaration of protective covenants in 1979.
- The covenants included: (1) lots used “exclusively for residential purposes”; (3) one single-family dwelling per lot plus incidental structures; (5) “no nuisance”; and (6) no raising/harboring of livestock or poultry, except this livestock restriction “shall not be applicable to Lots Nos. 1–7, inclusive, Section D.”
- Turner retained ownership of Lots 4B, 5, 6, and 7 in Section D (referred to as the “pasture”); neighboring homeowners Michael and Carol Caplan and Grady and Martha Carrigan owned lots adjoining the pasture.
- Turner kept a single horse on the pasture intermittently over several periods, including from 2002 onward depending on conditions.
- The Caplans sought an injunction to bar Turner from keeping the horse; the Carrigans intervened.
- The circuit court held that keeping a horse violated the covenants’ residential-purpose requirement, violated the livestock prohibition, and constituted a nuisance, and entered a permanent injunction.
- Turner appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the subdivision covenants, read as a whole, prohibited keeping a horse on Lots 1–7, Section D despite an express exception from the livestock restriction for those lots.
2. Whether keeping a horse on the pasture constituted a “nuisance” under the covenants sufficient to support injunctive relief.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the injunction.
- The Court held the covenants did not prohibit raising or harboring livestock on Lots 1–7, Section D because Covenant 6 expressly exempted those lots from the livestock restriction.
- The Court held the evidence did not support a finding that Turner’s intermittent keeping of a single horse constituted a nuisance.
- The Court dissolved the permanent injunction.

## Legal Principles

- Interpretation of restrictive covenants is a question of law reviewed de novo.
- Covenants must be construed as a whole, interpreting provisions consistently where possible and avoiding constructions that render words or clauses meaningless.
- A general “residential purposes” restriction does not nullify a specific, clearly stated exception within the same declaration; a specific exemption must be given effect.
- An exception stated to apply to identified lots applies to the land itself, not solely to the original developer, absent clear limiting language.
- A nuisance finding requires evidentiary support of substantial, unreasonable interference; a use expressly allowed by covenant is not enjoined as a nuisance without proof meeting that standard.

## Conclusion

Because the declaration expressly exempted Lots 1–7, Section D from the livestock prohibition, keeping a horse on the pasture did not violate the covenants, and the record did not establish a nuisance; the permanent injunction was reversed and dissolved.


Turner v. Caplan, 268 Va. 122, 596 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 2004)