Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011)

Facts

  • A South Carolina family court ordered Michael D. Turner, an indigent noncustodial parent, to pay weekly child support to Rebecca L. Rogers.
  • Turner repeatedly failed to pay and was held in civil contempt multiple times, resulting in several jail sentences.
  • After a prior six-month contempt sentence, Turner was again cited for contempt for being more than $5,700 in arrears and was ordered to appear at a show-cause hearing.
  • At the contempt hearing, both Turner and Rogers appeared without counsel.
  • The hearing was brief; Turner offered explanations relating to inability to work.
  • The family court found Turner in willful contempt and sentenced him to 12 months’ imprisonment.
  • The court did not make an express finding about Turner’s ability to pay and did not indicate on the contempt form whether he had the ability to comply.
  • Turner served the full 12-month sentence.
  • The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting Turner’s claim that due process required appointed counsel in the civil contempt proceeding.

Issues

  1. Whether the case was moot because Turner had completed the contempt sentence.
  2. Whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires appointment of counsel for an indigent parent facing incarceration for civil contempt for failure to pay child support when the opposing parent is unrepresented.
  3. If counsel is not automatically required, what procedures due process requires before incarceration for civil contempt in a child-support case.

Decision

  • The Court held the case was not moot under the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception.
  • The Court held due process does not automatically require appointed counsel for an indigent noncustodial parent facing incarceration for civil contempt in a child-support case when the custodial parent is also unrepresented.
  • The Court held Turner’s incarceration violated due process because the proceeding lacked either appointed counsel or adequate substitute procedural protections focused on ability to pay.
  • The Court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its due process requirements.
  • A completed civil contempt sentence does not moot a challenge if the incarceration is too short to be fully litigated before it ends and there is a reasonable expectation the same party will face the same action again.
  • In civil contempt proceedings for nonpayment of child support, due process does not create a categorical right to appointed counsel when the opposing parent is unrepresented.
  • When counsel is not provided in such cases, due process requires alternative procedures sufficient to reduce the risk of erroneous incarceration on the central question of ability to pay, including:
    • clear notice that ability to pay is a critical issue;
    • a fair opportunity to present and dispute financial information;
    • use of forms or equivalent methods to elicit relevant financial data; and
    • express court findings on the obligor’s ability to comply before incarceration is imposed.

Conclusion

The Court ruled that incarceration for civil contempt in a child-support case cannot rest on procedures that fail to test and decide the obligor’s ability to pay; while appointed counsel is not automatically required when neither parent is represented, the State must provide meaningful safeguards and explicit ability-to-pay findings before jailing an indigent parent for nonpayment.