Tyler v. State, 47 P.3d 1095 (2001)

Facts

  • David A. Tyler entered no-contest pleas in two separate driving while intoxicated (DWI) cases.
  • Alaska law treated a later DWI as a felony when the defendant had two prior DWI convictions within the statutory period.
  • Attorney Eugene B. Cyrus represented Tyler in a later DWI prosecution that resulted in a felony DWI conviction.
  • Tyler appealed, advancing a theory that depended on attacking the two earlier no-contest pleas: if those pleas were withdrawn and the State later obtained convictions again, Tyler argued the later convictions would count as “new” convictions rather than “prior” convictions for felony classification purposes.
  • The State took the opposite view: even if Tyler withdrew the earlier pleas and was convicted again, those convictions would still be treated as prior convictions, leaving Tyler’s felony exposure unchanged.
  • Neither side cited McGhee v. State, an Alaska Supreme Court decision that addressed the same question and rejected the “new conviction” theory; in McGhee, a re-conviction after withdrawal of a prior plea was treated as a prior conviction for purposes of felony treatment.
  • The prosecutor did not cite McGhee because he was unaware of it, but Cyrus had personal knowledge of McGhee because he had represented the defendant in that case.
  • After the Court of Appeals dismissed Tyler’s appeal on other grounds, it ordered Cyrus to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed for failing to disclose McGhee, invoking Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3(a)(3) and the court’s sanction authority under the appellate rules.
  • Cyrus responded that he did not believe McGhee was “controlling authority” and argued that reasonable lawyers and judges could disagree on whether it governed Tyler’s appeal.

Issues

  1. Whether Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3(a)(3) required Tyler’s appellate counsel to disclose McGhee v. State as controlling, directly adverse authority when opposing counsel did not cite it.
  2. Whether counsel’s failure to disclose McGhee warranted sanctions under the Alaska appellate rules.

Decision

  • The court held that McGhee was controlling authority in Alaska and directly contrary to the legal position Cyrus presented for Tyler.
  • The court ruled that Rule 3.3(a)(3) required Cyrus to disclose McGhee even though it harmed Tyler’s argument and even though the State did not cite it.
  • The court rejected Cyrus’s attempt to excuse nondisclosure based on asserted disagreement about McGhee’s reach; at minimum, he was required to cite McGhee and then argue why it should be limited or distinguished.
  • The court concluded that Cyrus violated his duty of candor to the tribunal and imposed sanctions under the applicable appellate sanction rule.

Legal Principles

  • A lawyer must disclose legal authority from the controlling jurisdiction that the lawyer knows is directly adverse to the client’s position when opposing counsel has not disclosed it. (Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3(a)(3).)
  • An attorney cannot withhold an on-point decision from the jurisdiction’s highest court simply because the attorney believes the case can be distinguished; the attorney must cite the case and then explain the proposed distinction or limitation.
  • The duty to disclose adverse authority is independent of whether the opposing party is aware of that authority; the rule is triggered precisely when the other side has not brought the authority to the court’s attention.
  • When an attorney has personal knowledge of an adverse controlling decision—especially one the attorney previously litigated—the attorney’s obligation to inform the court is at its strongest.
  • Appellate courts may sanction attorneys for conduct that violates the duty of candor and misleads the court about the state of the law.

Conclusion

Tyler v. State, 47 P.3d 1095 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001), addresses attorney sanctions rather than Tyler’s underlying felony DWI conviction: the Court of Appeals concluded that appellate counsel Eugene Cyrus violated Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3(a)(3) by failing to disclose the Alaska Supreme Court’s directly adverse and controlling decision in McGhee v. State, and the court imposed sanctions for the omission.