## Facts

- Mary M. Tyndall, a part-time instructor at a business college, had lupus erythematosus; the employer knew of her condition when hiring her.
- The employer permitted significant flexibility, including sick leave, late arrival/early departure, breaks during class, and coworker assistance when she became ill.
- Tyndall admitted the employer never denied any accommodation request related to her lupus.
- In early 1992, Tyndall’s absences increased; from January to mid-July she missed nineteen workdays, including days due to lupus and days to care for her son, who had a medical condition; the employer approved the absences.
- Her absences required other instructors to cover classes and disrupted operations.
- After a meeting about her prolonged absences and an anticipated additional leave for her son’s surgery, management suggested she resign and apply for reemployment later; paperwork described the separation as mutual, though Tyndall claimed she was effectively discharged.
- Tyndall filed administrative and then judicial claims asserting disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, associational discrimination based on her son’s disability, and related state-law claims.

## Issues

1. Whether Tyndall was a “qualified individual with a disability” under the ADA when she could not meet regular attendance expectations for her teaching position.
2. Whether the employer failed to provide reasonable accommodation for Tyndall’s disability.
3. Whether the employer violated the ADA by taking adverse action because of Tyndall’s association with a disabled family member.
4. Whether the employer was liable under the Virginians with Disabilities Act on the same facts.

## Decision

- The Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the employer on all claims.
- The court held Tyndall was not a “qualified individual with a disability” because regular, reliable attendance was an essential job function for an instructor and she could not satisfy that requirement even with accommodations.
- The court found no triable issue on failure to accommodate where the employer provided substantial flexibility and did not refuse requested accommodations.
- The court rejected associational discrimination because the record showed the employer responded to excessive absenteeism, not bias toward the son’s disability.
- The court applied a strong inference of nondiscrimination because the same supervisor hired Tyndall knowing of her disability and later participated in the separation decision.

## Legal Principles

- ADA protection requires the plaintiff to be a “qualified individual with a disability,” meaning she can perform the job’s essential functions with reasonable accommodation.
- Regular and reliable attendance may be an essential job function, particularly where the work requires the employee’s physical presence (e.g., classroom instruction).
- Reasonable accommodation does not require eliminating or reallocating essential functions, and does not obligate an employer to tolerate unpredictable, indefinite absences that prevent performance of essential duties.
- An associational discrimination claim requires evidence that the adverse action was because of the employee’s relationship with a disabled person; action based on attendance problems, even if caused by caregiving, is not enough without proof of disability-based animus.
- When the same decisionmaker hires and later fires an employee while aware of the disability, that circumstance supports an inference that the employer’s stated reason is not pretextual.

## Conclusion

The court held that a part-time instructor with frequent absences—though arising from her own disability and caregiving responsibilities—was not “qualified” under the ADA where regular attendance was essential, and the employer’s extensive flexibility satisfied any accommodation duty while the same-actor evidence supported the absence of discriminatory motive.


Tyndall v. Nat'l Educ. Ctrs., Inc., 31 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 1994)