## Facts

- Lawanna Tynes, an African American woman, served as superintendent of a juvenile detention center operated by the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice.
- While Tynes was on leave, a high number of incidents occurred at the facility.
- The Department’s secretary terminated Tynes for poor performance, negligence, and misconduct, despite no prior formal discipline.
- Tynes alleged race and sex discrimination, pointing to two white superintendents (one male, one female) who experienced similar incident spikes but received only oral reprimands.
- At trial, Tynes presented evidence that the termination decision reflected the decisionmaker’s personal bias and that the decisionmaker could not clearly explain the factual basis for terminating Tynes or show consistent discipline of other employees.
- A jury found intentional discrimination, awarded damages, and the district court ordered reinstatement.

## Issues

1. After a plaintiff wins a Title VII discrimination verdict, can a defendant obtain judgment as a matter of law by arguing the plaintiff failed to satisfy McDonnell Douglas prima facie comparator requirements at trial?
2. Did the Department preserve appellate challenges that the § 1981 claim was inadequately pleaded and that the evidence failed to show race was the but-for cause of termination?

## Decision

- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment for Tynes on Title VII and § 1981.
- The court held that McDonnell Douglas is an evidentiary, pre-verdict framework and not a set of substantive elements required to sustain a jury verdict.
- Because the Department did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s finding of intentional discrimination, an argument focused on prima facie comparator proof did not justify judgment as a matter of law.
- The court held the Department forfeited its § 1981 pleading and but-for causation arguments by failing to properly preserve them in the district court and by failing to meaningfully address the district court’s reliance on Rule 15(b)(1) regarding amendment at trial.

## Legal Principles

- McDonnell Douglas burden shifting is a tool for evaluating discrimination evidence; it does not replace the ultimate question of liability—whether the adverse action was taken because of unlawful discrimination.
- Post-verdict motions and appeals must address the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s finding of intentional discrimination; alleged defects in McDonnell Douglas prima facie showings are not, by themselves, grounds to overturn an unchallenged discrimination verdict.
- Appellate review is limited by preservation rules; arguments not properly raised in Rule 50 practice or otherwise preserved in the district court may be forfeited.
- Under Rule 15(b)(1), when an issue is tried by consent and no prejudice is shown, pleadings may be treated as amended; failure to contest that basis can forfeit pleading-based attacks on the verdict.

## Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit upheld a jury finding of intentional employment discrimination, holding that McDonnell Douglas does not operate as a post-trial liability checklist and that the employer’s unpreserved § 1981 pleading and but-for causation objections could not be used to undo the verdict.


Tynes v. Fla. Dep’t of Juvenile Just., 88 F.4th 939 (11th Cir. 2023)