## Facts

- Alfred E. Uchtorff died in 1979, survived by his wife, Pearl, and his son, Richard.
- Alfred’s will exercised a power of appointment over an existing trust (“Trust A”) through Item VI.
- Item VI provided Pearl a lifetime right to the trust’s net income.
- Item VI, subdivision 3, governed disposition upon certain stated events (including Pearl’s death after Alfred) and then set out alternative dispositions.
- Subparagraph (a) stated that if Richard survived Alfred, the trust property was appointed to Richard “as an indefeasibly vested interest in fee.”
- Subparagraph (b) provided that if Richard did not survive Alfred, the property would go in trust for the issue of Richard’s marriage to Carolyn (his first wife), subject to stated divestment terms.
- After Alfred’s death, Richard divorced Carolyn, married Christa, and later died before Pearl.
- Richard’s will left his estate to Christa.
- After Pearl later died, a dispute arose over whether Trust A’s corpus passed to Christa (through Richard’s estate) or to Richard’s children from his first marriage.

## Issues

1. Whether Item VI granted Richard an indefeasibly vested remainder upon Alfred’s death conditioned only on Richard surviving Alfred, with possession postponed until Pearl’s life estate ended.
2. Whether Richard’s interest was instead contingent on surviving Pearl, such that his death before Pearl caused the property to pass under the alternative provision benefiting Richard’s children.

## Decision

- The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the district court.
- The court held Richard’s interest vested indefeasibly at Alfred’s death because Richard satisfied the stated condition of surviving Alfred.
- The court held Richard’s death before Pearl affected only possession and enjoyment, not vesting.
- The trust corpus therefore passed through Richard’s estate under his will to Christa, and not to Richard’s children under the alternative clause.
- The case was remanded for proceedings consistent with that construction.

## Legal Principles

- Will construction aims to carry out the testator’s intent as expressed by the instrument read as a whole, giving technical terms their established legal meaning.
- A gift expressly conditioned on the beneficiary “surviv[ing] me” generally conditions vesting on survival of the testator, not on survival of a life tenant, absent clear language imposing the latter condition.
- Language granting an “indefeasibly vested” interest signals an immediately vested remainder not subject to divestment by later events other than termination of the preceding estate.
- A prior life estate typically postpones possession, not vesting, when the remainder is otherwise stated as vested.
- When a will provides an alternative gift only if the primary beneficiary does not survive the testator, that alternative does not take effect if the beneficiary in fact survives the testator.

## Conclusion

The court construed Item VI to give Richard an indefeasibly vested remainder upon Alfred’s death because Richard survived Alfred, making the children’s alternative provision inoperative and causing the trust corpus to pass under Richard’s will to his widow, despite Richard’s death before the life tenant.


Uchtorff v. Hanson, 693 N.W.2d 790 (Iowa 2005)