Neighbour Principle

Introduction

The neighbour principle sits at the core of negligence in tort law. It asks a simple question with far‑reaching consequences: who do you owe a duty of care to? The modern answer comes from Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562. Lord Atkin explained that you must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions you can reasonably foresee are likely to injure your “neighbour” — meaning people who are so closely and directly affected by your act that you ought to have them in contemplation.

This approach moved the law beyond contract and privity. It recognises that individuals and organisations can owe duties to others affected by their conduct even without a contract. In applying the principle, courts look chiefly at foreseeability and proximity, and then consider whether wider policy reasons suggest a duty should not be recognised. Those themes continue to guide modern cases, especially where claims involve public bodies or pure economic loss.

What You'll Learn

• The wording and meaning of the neighbour principle from Donoghue v Stevenson
• How foreseeability and proximity operate together to shape duty of care
• The Caparo three‑stage approach (foreseeability, proximity, fair, just and reasonable) and its limits
• Why omissions and third‑party harm usually do not create a duty — and the main exceptions
• How courts approach claims against public bodies after CN v Poole BC
• The objective standard of care, including the position of learner drivers (Nettleship v Weston)
• When pure economic loss is unrecoverable (Murphy v Brentwood DC) and when duties may arise (e.g., auditors and misstatements)
• The difference between negligence and nuisance claims (Hunter v Canary Wharf)
• A structured method for analysing problem questions and real‑world scenarios

Core Concepts

Origins: Donoghue v Stevenson and the general duty of care

Donoghue v Stevenson involved a consumer who became ill after drinking ginger beer that allegedly contained a decomposed snail. There was no contract between Mrs Donoghue and the manufacturer. The House of Lords nevertheless recognised a general duty of care: a person must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which could reasonably be foreseen to injure their “neighbour”.

Lord Atkin’s neighbour test broadened the reach of negligence: you may owe a duty to those closely and directly affected by your acts even without a contractual link. The case also confirmed that manufacturers owe a duty to end consumers, laying the groundwork for product liability in negligence.

Proximity and foreseeability

Two recurring requirements shape the duty analysis:

• Foreseeability: Would a reasonable person in the defendant’s position have foreseen a real risk of harm to the claimant?
• Proximity: Is there a sufficiently close and direct relationship (physical, causal, or relational) between defendant and claimant?

These elements work together. Foreseeability alone is not enough; there must also be a close and direct relationship that justifies placing the defendant under a duty. Proximity can arise from:

• Physical closeness (e.g., road users to other road users)
• Specific relationships (e.g., professional to client)
• Assumption of responsibility and reasonable reliance

Example: In Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 QB 691, a learner driver owed the same standard of care as a competent driver. Harm to a passenger was plainly foreseeable, and the relationship on the road was sufficiently close and direct. The court applied an objective standard rather than adjusting it for inexperience.

The modern duty approach: Caparo and public body cases

In Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] UKHL 2, the House of Lords articulated three questions for novel duty situations:

1. Was harm reasonably foreseeable?
2. Was there proximity between claimant and defendant?
3. Is it fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty?

Caparo is a helpful structure but not a universal formula. Courts prefer to proceed incrementally, comparing new situations to established duty categories. The “fair, just and reasonable” stage allows policy concerns to be weighed in marginal cases.

Public bodies: After CN v Poole BC [2019] UKSC 25, the Supreme Court confirmed that public bodies do not owe a duty of care merely because they have statutory powers or duties. A duty may arise if the public authority:

• Created a source of danger;
• Assumed responsibility to the claimant; or
• Stands in a recognised duty category under common law.

Earlier cases such as X v Bedfordshire CC [1995] 2 AC 633 illustrate how policy considerations can mean that imposing a private law duty would not be fair or workable in certain welfare and social care contexts.

Omissions and third‑party harm: As a general rule, the common law does not impose a duty to prevent harm caused by others or to confer a benefit. Exceptions include: assumption of responsibility, control over a third party/situation, or creation of a danger. Swinney v Chief Constable of Northumbria [1997] QB 464 shows that a special relationship (e.g., police and a confidential informant) may establish a duty where there is a clear undertaking and reliance.

Customs & Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc [2006] UKHL 28 shows the careful analysis at the third Caparo stage. The House of Lords declined to impose a duty on a bank said to have failed to implement a freezing order properly, emphasising the need to consider fairness and the statutory framework.

Standard of care and breach (briefly)

Once a duty is found, the standard is that of the reasonable person in the circumstances. It is objective and does not usually vary with inexperience. Nettleship confirms that learners are judged by the standard of the competent person undertaking the activity. Factors like magnitude of risk, practicality of precautions, and social utility are relevant to breach, but those sit beyond the neighbour principle’s duty question.

Key Examples or Case Studies

Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562

• Context: Consumer harmed by a defective product with no contract with the manufacturer.
• Ruling: A general duty of care was recognised based on foreseeability and proximity.
• Practical note: Duty of care can exist independent of contract; manufacturers owe duties to end users.

Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 QB 691

• Context: Claim against a learner driver by her instructor/passenger.
• Ruling: The objective standard applies; learners are held to the standard of competent drivers.
• Practical note: Foreseeability on the road plus close relationship leads to a clear duty of care.

Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] UKHL 2

• Context: Investors sued auditors over audited accounts.
• Ruling: Three-stage approach to novel duty situations; claim failed on proximity and fairness.
• Practical note: Caparo frames duty analysis for new categories but does not replace established duties.

CN v Poole BC [2019] UKSC 25

• Context: Claim alleging failure by a council to protect children from harassment by neighbours.
• Ruling: No general duty arises from statutory functions alone; consider assumption of responsibility or creation of danger.
• Practical note: For public bodies, focus on whether the authority made matters worse or undertook a specific responsibility.

X v Bedfordshire CC [1995] 2 AC 633

• Context: Claims against a local authority for alleged negligent handling of child welfare concerns.
• Ruling: Duty restricted due to policy concerns and the statutory context.
• Practical note: Courts may decline to impose duties where it would not be fair or workable in light of public functions.

Swinney v Chief Constable of Northumbria [1997] QB 464

• Context: Police allegedly failed to protect a confidential informant whose details were disclosed.
• Ruling: Possible duty due to a special relationship and reliance; claim allowed to proceed.
• Practical note: Assumption of responsibility and reliance can create proximity in omission cases.

Murphy v Brentwood DC [1991] 1 AC 398

• Context: Defective property due to negligent inspection by a local authority.
• Ruling: Pure economic loss for defects to the property itself is not recoverable; Anns overruled.
• Practical note: Distinguish between damage to other property or personal injury (potentially recoverable) and pure economic loss (generally not).

Customs & Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc [2006] UKHL 28

• Context: Alleged failure by a bank to implement a freezing order, causing loss.
• Ruling: No duty on the bank; fairness and the statutory scheme weighed against imposing a duty.
• Practical note: The third Caparo stage can be decisive where duties would cut across statutory processes.

Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd [1997] AC 655

• Context: Claims for interference with television reception by residents near a new tower.
• Ruling: No actionable nuisance for TV reception; nuisance requires proprietary interest.
• Practical note: Don’t confuse negligence with property-based torts; the neighbour principle addresses negligence duties, not nuisance requirements.

Practical Applications

• Start with the type of loss:

  • Personal injury or physical damage: standard duty analysis applies.
  • Pure economic loss: proceed with caution; generally not recoverable unless within a recognised category (e.g., negligent misstatement with assumption of responsibility).

• Apply a structured duty analysis:

  1. Foreseeability: Was some harm to the claimant a real possibility?
  2. Proximity: Was there a close and direct relationship (physical, relational, or causal)?
  3. Fair, just and reasonable: Are there policy reasons for or against recognising a duty?

• Public bodies:

  • Identify if the body created a danger or assumed responsibility.
  • Check for statutory schemes that indicate how duties should be discharged and whether private law duties would clash with that framework (CN v Poole; Barclays).
  • Be ready for policy arguments (X v Bedfordshire).

• Omissions and third‑party acts:

  • No general duty to prevent harm caused by others.
  • Look for exceptions: assumption of responsibility, control, or creation of risk.
  • Evidence of reliance and specific undertakings strengthens proximity (Swinney).

• Professional advisers and auditors:

  • Consider whether the defendant assumed responsibility to the claimant and whether reliance was reasonable.
  • Courts may recognise duties where the adviser knew the information would be used for a specific purpose by an identified class (see Caparo; Coulthard v Neville Russell [1998] 1 BCLC 143 for auditor duties argued in favour of directors/shareholders in some circumstances).
  • Watch for disclaimers and the precise scope of any undertaking (Barclays highlights the importance of the fairness stage and statutory context).

• Standard of care and breach:

  • Duty found? Assess breach against the reasonable person standard.
  • Learners are not given a lower standard (Nettleship).
  • Consider risk factors, practicality of precautions, and common practice.

• Keep negligence distinct from other torts:

  • Nuisance focuses on interference with land and requires a proprietary interest (Hunter).
  • Don’t rely on the neighbour principle to fill gaps where the claim belongs in another tort.

• Exam and practice tips:

  • Use short headings in your analysis: Duty → Breach → Causation → Damage → Defences.
  • Pin your duty reasoning to leading authorities (Donoghue; Caparo; CN v Poole; Murphy).
  • Anticipate and address policy arguments where relevant.

Summary Checklist

• State the neighbour principle and identify potential “neighbours”
• Test foreseeability and proximity together; foreseeability alone is not enough
• Apply Caparo where the category is novel; compare with existing duty categories
• For public bodies, look for assumption of responsibility or creation of danger
• Remember the general rule against duties for omissions and third‑party harm, plus the main exceptions
• Separate negligence from nuisance and other torts
• For pure economic loss, check for recognised routes (e.g., negligent misstatement or defined advisory relationships)
• Use the objective standard of care; learners are judged by competent standards
• Consider policy at the “fair, just and reasonable” stage
• Cite the leading cases to support each step

Quick Reference