## Facts

- Ceylon’s Industrial Disputes Act authorized the Minister to establish Labour Tribunals to decide industrial disputes, including individual workmen’s claims for reinstatement and related relief.
- Presidents of Labour Tribunals had been appointed in practice by the Public Service Commission.
- The Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council 1946 vested the Judicial Service Commission with appointment and disciplinary control over “judicial officers.”
- A union member was dismissed by his employer, and the union applied to a Labour Tribunal for reinstatement and other relief.
- The Labour Tribunal President ordered reinstatement and granted additional relief.
- The employer challenged the tribunal’s jurisdiction by attacking the validity of the President’s appointment, contending the President was a “judicial officer” who could only be appointed by the Judicial Service Commission.
- The Supreme Court of Ceylon agreed, treated the tribunal President as a “judicial officer,” and invalidated the tribunal’s order.
- The union appealed to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

## Issues

1. Whether a President of a Labour Tribunal is a “judicial officer” under s. 55(5) of the Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council 1946, requiring appointment by the Judicial Service Commission rather than the Public Service Commission.
2. Whether, in proceedings concerning whether gratuity or “other benefits” “are due” to a workman, a Labour Tribunal is limited to determining strict legal entitlement or may award whatever it considers “just and equitable.”

## Decision

- The Privy Council allowed the appeal and set aside the Supreme Court’s judgment.
- By majority, the Privy Council held a President of a Labour Tribunal did not hold “judicial office” for purposes of the constitutional appointment provisions; appointment by the Public Service Commission was valid.
- By majority, the Privy Council held that “are due” in the Industrial Disputes Act did not mean “legally due”; the tribunal could grant benefits beyond strict legal entitlement if a “just and equitable” order warranted it.
- Two members dissented on the constitutional characterization, treating the tribunal President as exercising judicial power and therefore requiring appointment through the Judicial Service Commission.

## Legal Principles

- Whether an office is “judicial” for constitutional appointment purposes turns on the overall nature of the office’s functions, not merely the presence of hearings, evidence, or impartial decision-making.
- Labour Tribunals under the Industrial Disputes Act functioned more like industrial arbitration bodies empowered to make “just and equitable” awards, rather than courts confined to enforcing pre-existing legal rights.
- A statutory mandate to make a “just and equitable” order can authorize remedial awards exceeding strict contractual or statutory entitlements when the statute’s text and structure indicate that broader discretion.
- The duty to observe natural justice may render a body quasi-judicial without making it part of the constitutional judiciary or its officers “judicial officers.”

## Conclusion

The Privy Council upheld the constitutional validity of Labour Tribunal presidents appointed outside the Judicial Service Commission and confirmed that, in specified workman applications, Labour Tribunals could award relief on a “just and equitable” basis even when not strictly “legally due.”


United Eng’g Workers Union v. Devanayagam, [1967] 2 All E.R. 367 (P.C. 1967)