## Facts

- Joseph Accardi, an Italian national, entered the United States in 1932 without inspection or a visa and later became subject to deportation proceedings initiated in 1947.
- Accardi applied in 1948 for suspension of deportation under § 19(c) of the Immigration Act of 1917 (as amended), which vested discretionary authority in the Attorney General.
- Regulations in effect delegated that discretionary authority to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and required the BIA to exercise its own independent judgment in deciding such applications.
- A hearing officer found Accardi deportable and recommended denial of discretionary relief; the BIA denied suspension.
- Accardi filed a federal habeas petition alleging the denial was effectively prejudged because the Attorney General had circulated a confidential list of “unsavory characters” that included Accardi, allegedly preventing fair and independent consideration by the BIA.
- The district court denied relief without taking evidence on Accardi’s allegations; the Second Circuit affirmed.
- The Supreme Court granted review to determine whether Accardi was entitled to develop proof that the BIA failed to exercise its own discretion as required by regulation.

## Issues

1. Whether a habeas petitioner is entitled to a factual opportunity to prove that administrative adjudicators denied discretionary relief based on prejudgment or dictation by a superior official.
2. Whether, while regulations delegate discretionary decisionmaking to the BIA, the Attorney General may sidestep the delegation by directing or dictating outcomes in individual cases.
3. Whether agency action is erroneous when decisionmakers fail to follow binding regulations requiring independent exercise of discretion.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
- Accardi was entitled to an opportunity in the district court to prove that the BIA’s denial was dictated or prejudged by the Attorney General’s confidential list.
- If Accardi substantiated that claim, he was entitled to a new BIA hearing free from the effects of prior proscription.
- The Court treated the habeas allegations as sufficient to charge that the BIA did not independently exercise the discretion delegated to it by regulation.
- The Court rejected the argument that prior proceedings barred the claim, holding res judicata inapplicable to habeas corpus.

## Legal Principles

- When valid regulations delegate discretionary authority to an administrative tribunal and require independent judgment, the superior official who issued those regulations cannot dictate outcomes in individual cases while the regulations remain operative.
- Courts may set aside administrative action not for the substance of discretion exercised, but for failure to exercise discretion in the manner required by binding regulations.
- A habeas court must allow factual development where a petitioner plausibly alleges that an agency adjudication was tainted by improper command influence inconsistent with governing regulations.
- Res judicata does not bar a habeas petitioner from raising such a claim.

## Conclusion

The Court held that, because regulations required the BIA to exercise independent discretion on suspension of deportation, Accardi was entitled to attempt to prove that the Attorney General’s confidential listing improperly dictated the outcome; if proved, the denial could not stand and a new, untainted hearing was required.


United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954)