## Facts

- Providence police officers in plain clothes and an unmarked car stopped James H. Abernathy, who was driving a Massachusetts-registered vehicle.
- An officer observed the butt of a .45 caliber Colt semi-automatic pistol protruding from under the driver’s seat.
- Abernathy, a previously convicted felon, was federally indicted for:
  - 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (felon in possession of a firearm that had moved in interstate commerce), and
  - 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) (possession or carrying of a firearm with an obliterated serial number that had traveled in interstate commerce).
- Abernathy pleaded guilty to both counts.
- During the plea process, neither counsel nor the court appears to have advised Abernathy that § 922(k) requires proof the defendant knew the serial number was obliterated.
- At sentencing, the court applied U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4), enhancing the offense level because the firearm had an altered or obliterated serial number, regardless of knowledge.
- The court imposed 110 months’ imprisonment (plus supervised release) on Count I and a concurrent 60-month term on Count II.
- More than a year later, the district court vacated the sentence to restore Abernathy’s right to a direct appeal; Abernathy then moved to withdraw his pleas, was denied, and received the same sentence on resentencing.

## Issues

1. Whether the vehicle stop was lawful under the Fourth Amendment, making the firearm admissible.
2. Whether Abernathy could withdraw his guilty pleas after having been sentenced once, particularly for § 922(k) given the unaddressed knowledge element.
3. Whether 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 922(k) are constitutional exercises of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

## Decision

- The court affirmed the denial of suppression, holding the stop was supported by evidence of traffic violations and was lawful.
- The court held that, because Abernathy had been sentenced once, the stricter post-sentencing plea-withdrawal standard applied despite the later vacatur to restore appeal rights.
- The court affirmed the denial of plea withdrawal and the conviction and sentence on Count I (§ 922(g)(1)).
- The court reversed as to Count II (§ 922(k)), holding the plea could not stand because the knowledge element was not understood, explained, or admitted; it vacated the conviction and sentence on Count II.
- The court rejected Commerce Clause challenges to §§ 922(g)(1) and 922(k) and affirmed their constitutionality.

## Legal Principles

- A traffic stop is lawful when supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause of a traffic violation; officers’ undercover status or investigatory assignment does not invalidate an otherwise proper traffic stop.
- After a defendant has been sentenced, withdrawal of a guilty plea requires a showing of a fundamental defect amounting to a miscarriage of justice or an omission inconsistent with basic fair procedure; vacating a sentence to restore appellate rights does not restore a pre-sentencing plea-withdrawal standard.
- 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) requires proof the defendant knew the firearm’s serial number was obliterated; a guilty plea taken without adequate notice or admission of that essential element cannot be upheld.
- U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)’s enhancement for an altered or obliterated serial number applies without regard to the defendant’s knowledge, and does not eliminate the statute’s mens rea requirement.
- Firearm prohibitions requiring an interstate-commerce nexus, including §§ 922(g)(1) and 922(k), fall within Congress’s commerce power.

## Conclusion

The First Circuit upheld the stop and sustained the constitutionality of the federal firearm statutes, but vacated Abernathy’s § 922(k) conviction and sentence because his plea did not establish that he knew the firearm had an obliterated serial number, an essential element of that offense.


United States v. Abernathy, 83 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1996)