## Facts

- Anthony Joseph Accardo was indicted on three counts of willfully making and subscribing false federal income tax returns for tax years 1956, 1957, and 1958, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1).
- Before 1956, Accardo reported income from “gambling and undisclosed sources.”
- In 1954, the Internal Revenue Service directed Accardo to maintain detailed records going forward; in 1955, counsel responded that no records existed to support requested substantiation.
- For 1956–1958, Accardo reported substantial income as a beer salesman/agent for Premium Beer Sales, Inc., and claimed automobile-expense deductions tied to “promoting beer sales.”
- The returns asserted that 80% (1956) or 90% (1957–1958) of automobile use was business-related for Premium.
- Each count alleged Accardo falsely represented his employment/agency relationship with Premium and falsely represented the business nature and percentage of his automobile expenses.
- At a nearly nine-week jury trial, the government presented witness testimony and investigative evidence tending to show Accardo’s claimed beer-sales role and related automobile use were not as represented.
- The jury convicted Accardo on all counts; the district court imposed an aggregate sentence of six years’ imprisonment and a $15,000 fine.

## Issues

1. Whether the indictment, largely tracking § 7206(1), sufficiently stated the offenses, provided adequate notice, and avoided duplicity.
2. Whether use of a special grand jury and special prosecuting assistants required dismissal as an improper prosecutorial program or otherwise tainted the indictment.
3. Whether claimed trial-management, evidentiary, jury-selection, or instructional errors deprived Accardo of a fair trial warranting reversal.
4. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Accardo willfully made false statements as to material matters in the 1956–1958 returns.

## Decision

- The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions on all three counts.
- The court held the indictment was sufficient, not duplicitous, and adequately informed Accardo of the charged falsities for each tax year and return.
- The court rejected the challenge to the use of a special grand jury and special assistants absent a concrete showing of impropriety or improper influence in the case.
- The court found no reversible error in trial conduct, evidentiary rulings, or jury instructions when viewed in the context of the full proceedings.
- The court held the evidence permitted a rational jury to find that Accardo knowingly and willfully subscribed returns he did not believe were true as to material matters, including his asserted status with Premium and the asserted business use of automobile expenses.

## Legal Principles

- An indictment under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) is generally sufficient when it alleges the statutory elements, identifies the returns and tax years, and describes the nature of the alleged false statements with enough specificity to permit defense preparation and to bar double jeopardy.
- False statements about a taxpayer’s business role and about the business nature and percentage of expense use can constitute “material” matters under § 7206(1) when they bear directly on claimed deductions and tax liability.
- Willfulness under § 7206(1) may be proved by circumstantial evidence, including repeated misstatements, lack of supporting records despite notice to keep records, and testimony contradicting the asserted business activity and expense use.
- The mere participation of special prosecutors or use of a special grand jury does not invalidate an indictment without a specific showing of improper influence or misconduct affecting the charging decision or proceedings.

## Conclusion

The court upheld Accardo’s § 7206(1) convictions, concluding the indictment adequately charged willful falsity as to material matters and that the trial record supported the jury’s findings that Accardo knowingly made false representations about his Premium-related employment and automobile-expense deductions.


United States v. Accardo, 298 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1962)