## Facts

- Cedrick Bernard Alderman was arrested during an attempted cocaine purchase.
- At the time of his arrest, Alderman was wearing a bulletproof vest (body armor).
- Alderman had a prior conviction for a felony that qualified as a “crime of violence.”
- Federal prosecutors indicted Alderman under 18 U.S.C. § 931(a), which bars a person convicted of a crime of violence from purchasing, owning, or possessing body armor that has been “sold or offered for sale in interstate commerce.”
- Alderman moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that Congress lacked authority under the Commerce Clause to enact § 931(a).
- The district court denied the motion to dismiss.
- Alderman entered a conditional guilty plea, admitting the vest had crossed state lines while preserving his right to appeal the constitutionality of § 931(a).
- Alderman appealed to the Ninth Circuit.

## Issues

1. Does 18 U.S.C. § 931(a) exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause power when it criminalizes a violent felon’s possession of body armor that has been “sold or offered for sale in interstate commerce”?

## Decision

- The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court and upheld Alderman’s conviction.
- The court held that § 931(a) is a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority because it contains an express interstate-commerce element requiring that the body armor was “sold or offered for sale in interstate commerce.”
- Relying on Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent applying a “minimal nexus” approach to similar jurisdictional elements (including Scarborough and Ninth Circuit cases following it), the court concluded that proof the item previously moved through interstate commerce satisfies the commerce connection for this type of possession offense.
- The court distinguished § 931(a) from statutes invalidated in cases like Lopez and Morrison because § 931(a) is limited to body armor tied to interstate commerce on a case-by-case basis.
- Because Alderman admitted the vest had crossed state lines, the interstate-commerce element was satisfied as applied to him.

## Legal Principles

- Congress may regulate possession of an article of commerce by a defined class of persons when the statute includes a jurisdictional element that links each prosecution to interstate commerce.
- Under Scarborough-type precedent, the Commerce Clause nexus can be satisfied by showing that the regulated item previously traveled in interstate commerce (a minimal connection), where the statute requires such a connection.
- A federal criminal statute with an express interstate-commerce element is materially different, for Commerce Clause purposes, from statutes that regulate noneconomic intrastate conduct without any commerce limitation.

## Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 931(a) falls within Congress’s Commerce Clause power because it applies only when the body armor has been “sold or offered for sale in interstate commerce,” and Alderman’s admitted interstate movement of the vest satisfied that element; his conviction was therefore affirmed.


United States v. Alderman, 565 F.3d 641 (2009)