## Facts

- Ahmed Amer and Mona Amer, Egyptian citizens, married in 1980 and later lived with their three children in Queens, New York.
- By April 1992, the marriage had deteriorated; Ahmed moved out, Mona had physical custody, and no custody order had been entered.
- In June 1992, during a weekend visit, Ahmed took the children without Mona’s knowledge or consent and removed them from the United States to Egypt.
- The eldest child had lived in New York for about eight years; the two younger children had lived in New York since birth.
- Ahmed retained the children in Egypt for more than six months.
- The government prosecuted Ahmed under the International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act (IPKCA), 18 U.S.C. § 1204, which criminalizes removing or retaining a child outside the United States with intent to obstruct another parent’s custodial rights.

## Issues

1. Whether IPKCA was unconstitutionally vague as applied to Ahmed’s conduct.
2. Whether IPKCA violated the Free Exercise Clause by criminalizing conduct allegedly motivated by religiously based custody beliefs.
3. Whether IPKCA incorporated affirmative defenses from the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Parental Child Abduction.
4. Whether the district court could require, as a special condition of supervised release, that Ahmed effect the children’s return to the United States.
5. Whether a three-level sentencing enhancement for substantial interference with the administration of justice was properly applied.

## Decision

- The Second Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence.
- The court rejected the vagueness challenge because Ahmed’s conduct fell within the statute’s core prohibition: removing and retaining U.S.-resident children abroad to obstruct the other parent’s physical custody rights.
- The court held the prosecution did not violate free-exercise protections because the statute is a neutral, generally applicable criminal law.
- The court held IPKCA does not import Hague Convention defenses; a defendant is limited to the affirmative defenses enumerated in IPKCA.
- The court upheld the supervised-release condition requiring Ahmed to effect the children’s return as authorized and reasonably related to the offense and sentencing purposes, and not barred by double jeopardy.
- The court upheld the three-level enhancement for substantial interference with the administration of justice based on the disruption to lawful custody adjudication and enforcement caused by the removal and retention abroad.

## Legal Principles

- A defendant whose conduct clearly falls within a statute’s prohibitions generally cannot prevail on an as-applied void-for-vagueness challenge based on asserted uncertainty at the statute’s margins.
- Neutral, generally applicable criminal laws may be enforced against religiously motivated conduct without violating the Free Exercise Clause, absent a targeted burden on religion.
- IPKCA affirmative defenses are limited to those expressly provided by the statute; defenses from separate civil regimes are not available in a criminal prosecution absent explicit incorporation.
- A special condition of supervised release may require affirmative conduct reasonably related to the offense and sentencing objectives and may be framed to address continuing consequences of the crime without constituting a second punishment.
- Conduct that significantly impedes custody-related legal processes and enforcement can support an enhancement for substantial interference with the administration of justice.

## Conclusion

The Second Circuit sustained an IPKCA conviction where a parent removed and retained children abroad to obstruct the other parent’s custodial rights, limiting defenses to those listed in the statute and approving both a supervised-release condition requiring efforts to return the children and a sentencing enhancement for interference with the administration of justice.


United States v. Amer, 110 F.3d 873 (2d Cir. 1997)