## Facts

- American Airlines and Braniff Airlines each operated major connecting hubs at Dallas–Fort Worth International Airport (DFW) in early 1982, giving them significant competitive advantages over other carriers.
- After the 1981 air traffic controllers’ strike, FAA limits on arrivals at DFW constrained expansion and entry, strengthening incumbent carriers’ positions.
- In several DFW city-pair markets, American and Braniff collectively carried very high shares of passengers (over 90% on certain nonstop routes and over 60% on others), indicating substantial market concentration.
- American’s president, Robert L. Crandall, made a recorded telephone call to Braniff’s president, Howard Putnam.
- During the call, Crandall proposed coordinated conduct to stop aggressive competition, raise fares (including a suggested 20% increase), and jointly control pricing and market conditions at DFW.
- Putnam rejected the proposal and provided the recording to the government.
- The United States filed a civil action seeking injunctive relief, alleging attempted monopolization under § 2 of the Sherman Act based on Crandall’s proposal and the market structure at DFW.

## Issues

1. Whether a § 2 Sherman Act attempted monopolization claim requires an allegation of an agreement to monopolize.
2. Whether a unilateral solicitation or proposal to a competitor to coordinate pricing and market control can constitute the conduct element of attempted monopolization when paired with specific intent and a dangerous probability of success.

## Decision

- The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal and remanded for further proceedings.
- The court held the complaint stated a plausible claim for attempted monopolization under § 2 even without alleging any agreement or consummated collusion.
- The court concluded that solicitation of a competitor to engage in anticompetitive conduct may qualify as actionable conduct for an attempt when the complaint also plausibly alleges specific intent and a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power.

## Legal Principles

- Attempted monopolization under § 2 requires: (1) specific intent to monopolize, (2) anticompetitive or predatory conduct, and (3) a dangerous probability of success in a relevant market.
- A § 2 attempt theory does not require an agreement; attempt liability is not limited to conduct that also satisfies § 1 conspiracy standards.
- A concrete proposal to coordinate pricing and market control directed to a direct competitor can constitute sufficient conduct toward monopolization, even if the competitor refuses and no agreement is formed.
- Dangerous probability may be plausibly inferred from high market shares and structural entry constraints that would enable successful exercise of market power if the proposal were accepted.

## Conclusion

The Fifth Circuit held that the government adequately pleaded attempted monopolization where a dominant firm’s president solicited a direct competitor to raise fares and jointly control a concentrated market, because § 2 attempt liability can be based on unilateral solicitation coupled with alleged specific intent and a dangerous probability of success.


United States v. American Airlines, Inc., 743 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1984)