## Facts

- Two active-duty U.S. Army sergeants participated in a scheme to remove military munitions from Fort Bragg and transfer them without authorization.
- Over multiple transactions, they supplied an undercover ATF agent with military weapons and explosives, including National Firearms Act “firearms” (e.g., machine guns and destructive devices) and other munitions, in exchange for money and drugs.
- A superseding indictment charged three separate § 371 conspiracies: (1) conspiracy to possess unregistered firearms, (2) conspiracy to transfer unregistered firearms, and (3) conspiracy to sell U.S. property, plus multiple substantive firearms, explosives, and government-property counts (and an additional weapons count against one defendant).
- At trial, defendants claimed they believed the undercover agent was acting for U.S. intelligence and that they acted in reasonable good-faith reliance on his apparent authority.
- Defendants sought to use classified material to support that belief; the district court limited classified evidence under CIPA.
- The district court declined to give a distinct “public authority/apparent authority” instruction, but instructed the jury to acquit if it had reasonable doubt whether defendants acted in good faith under a sincere belief their conduct was exempt from the law.
- Defendants were convicted and received lengthy sentences, including consecutive sentences on the three conspiracy counts.

## Issues

1. Whether limiting classified evidence under CIPA improperly prevented defendants from presenting their good-faith reliance theory.
2. Whether defendants were entitled to a separate jury instruction recognizing reliance on an agent’s apparent authority as an affirmative “public authority” defense rather than treating the claim as negating intent.
3. Whether the three § 371 conspiracy counts were multiplicitous because they reflected a single agreement, making consecutive sentences unlawful.

## Decision

- Convictions were affirmed on all counts.
- The district court’s limitations on classified evidence did not require reversal because defendants were able to present the essence of their good-faith theory and the jury was instructed on good faith as bearing on intent.
- The defendants’ “public authority/apparent authority” claim was properly handled as a mens rea (good-faith/mistake-of-fact) theory rather than a distinct affirmative defense instruction.
- The three § 371 conspiracy counts were multiplicitous because they arose from one overarching agreement; consecutive sentences on those counts were improper.
- Sentences were vacated and the case was remanded for resentencing consistent with the multiplicity ruling.

## Legal Principles

- A defendant’s asserted belief that conduct was undertaken under government direction may be presented to create reasonable doubt about criminal intent; it is commonly analyzed as a good-faith mistake of fact rather than a complete justification based on apparent authority alone.
- Trial courts may limit classified information under CIPA without violating defense rights where the defendant can still present the substance of the theory and the excluded material is cumulative, insufficiently relevant, or properly restricted.
- A single agreement with multiple illegal objectives ordinarily constitutes one § 371 conspiracy; prosecutors may not subdivide one agreement into multiple conspiracy counts merely by labeling different objectives.
- Consecutive sentences imposed on multiplicitous conspiracy counts must be vacated and corrected on remand.

## Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit upheld the defendants’ convictions arising from unauthorized removal and transfer of military armaments, but vacated the sentences because the government improperly divided a single § 371 agreement into multiple conspiracy counts, and it approved treating the defendants’ claimed intelligence-related reliance as evidence negating mens rea rather than a separate apparent-authority defense.


United States v. Anderson, 872 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1989)