## Facts

- Tai Loong Hong Marine Products, Ltd. (TLH), a Hong Kong seafood company, chartered the U.S.-flagged vessel *King Diamond II* (KD II) to operate on the high seas.
- Under the charter, KD II was to rendezvous with foreign fishing vessels, purchase shark fins at sea, transport the fins to Guatemala, and deliver them to TLH.
- In 2002, the U.S. Coast Guard boarded KD II in international waters off Guatemala and found approximately 64,695 pounds of shark fins aboard, with no corresponding shark carcasses.
- The government brought a civil forfeiture action under the Shark Finning Prohibition Act of 2000 (SFPA), which amended the Magnuson–Stevens Act to prohibit possession of shark fins obtained through “shark finning” by persons aboard a U.S. “fishing vessel.”
- The district court treated KD II as a “fishing vessel” under 16 U.S.C. § 1802(18)(B) and entered judgment of forfeiture; TLH appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether KD II qualified as a “fishing vessel” under 16 U.S.C. § 1802(18)(B) based on its at-sea purchasing, storing, and transporting of shark fins.
2. Whether, given the statute, regulations, and administrative context, applying the SFPA’s possession prohibition (and forfeiture) to KD II provided constitutionally sufficient fair notice.

## Decision

- The Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment of forfeiture and remanded.
- The court held that neither the statute nor implementing regulations gave TLH fair notice that KD II would be classified as a “fishing vessel” under § 1802(18)(B) based solely on its role as an at-sea buyer/transport vessel.
- Because the government’s enforcement position was not reasonably foreseeable from existing law and guidance, applying the SFPA possession prohibition to KD II violated due process.
- As applied on the government’s theory and record, forfeiture of the shark fins (or substitute res) could not stand.

## Legal Principles

- Due process requires fair notice: a law must give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited before significant sanctions may be imposed.
- Ambiguous statutory language, unclarified by regulations or established enforcement practice, cannot support forfeiture when the government relies on a novel, expansive interpretation not reasonably foreseeable at the time of the conduct.
- In construing § 1802(18)(B), “aid or assist” in fishing-related activities connotes supporting another vessel’s fishing operations; a vessel acting primarily for its own commercial purchase-and-transport purposes is not clearly covered absent clearer legal notice.

## Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit set aside the forfeiture because applying the SFPA to a vessel that merely bought, stored, and transported shark fins at sea lacked fair notice, rendering the statute unconstitutional as applied under due process principles.


United States v. Approximately 64,695 Pounds of Shark Fins, 520 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2008)