## Facts

- Anthony Arroyo, an SBA loan officer, reviewed and recommended approval of Orlando Fernandez’s SBA-guaranteed loan application.
- Frank Sanchez, a counselor at a local economic development organization assisting Fernandez, served as an intermediary between Fernandez and Arroyo.
- The SBA-approved loan was disbursed, but Fernandez was not told that approval and disbursement had already occurred.
- Sanchez told Fernandez additional “authorization” was still needed and that Arroyo could secure it.
- Sanchez later told Fernandez he would need to pay Arroyo $800 to “obtain” the loan, despite the loan having already been funded.
- Fernandez contacted the FBI; agents arranged and recorded a meeting where Arroyo accepted $500 as part of the demanded $800.
- Arroyo was arrested and acknowledged wrongdoing.
- Arroyo and Sanchez were convicted in federal district court of conspiracy to solicit a bribe; Arroyo was also convicted of soliciting and receiving a bribe as a public official under 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1).

## Issues

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1) applies when a public official solicits payment after the relevant official act has been performed, while representing that the act is still pending.
2. Whether the district court erred by refusing to instruct the jury that post-act payments fall outside § 201(c)(1) as mere gratuities and that bribery solicitation must precede the official act.

## Decision

- The Seventh Circuit affirmed all convictions.
- The court held § 201(c)(1) is not limited to solicitations made before the official act; it reaches corrupt solicitations “in return for” influence over an official act even if the act was already performed.
- The court held the district court properly refused the requested instruction because it improperly narrowed the statute and conflicted with its text and purpose.

## Legal Principles

- Under 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1), a public official violates the statute by corruptly soliciting or receiving something of value “in return for” being influenced in an official act; the statute is not restricted by a rigid pre-act/post-act timing rule.
- The statutory definition of “official act,” including matters that “may at any time be pending,” supports broad coverage and does not imply a limitation to future acts.
- A public official cannot avoid bribery liability by concealing that the official act was already completed and soliciting payment while falsely presenting the action as still forthcoming.
- A trial court may refuse a defense instruction that would recast corrupt quid pro quo solicitations as noncriminal gratuities based solely on timing, where the jury is otherwise instructed to find corrupt intent and an exchange “in return for” influence over official action.

## Conclusion

The court upheld convictions where an SBA official, aided by an intermediary, demanded money for purported loan approval even though the loan had already been approved and funded, holding that § 201(c)(1) covers corrupt quid pro quo solicitations regardless of whether the official act occurred before the demand, particularly when the official misrepresents the act as pending.


United States v. Arroyo, 581 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1978)