## Facts

- After the September 11 attacks, a federal grand jury in the Southern District of New York investigated the hijackings.
- Investigators found a paper with Osama Awadallah’s name and phone number in a vehicle associated with hijacker Nawaf Al-Hazmi.
- FBI agents in San Diego questioned Awadallah, obtained signed consent to search his apartment and car, and administered a polygraph; Awadallah later refused additional consent and revoked prior consent after a search had been completed.
- Awadallah was arrested on a material witness warrant under 18 U.S.C. § 3144 and detained pending grand jury testimony; he was held across multiple facilities, largely in solitary confinement, and denied bail twice.
- About twenty days after his arrest, Awadallah testified before the grand jury on October 10 and 15, 2001.
- He was later indicted on two counts of perjury under 18 U.S.C. § 1623 based on allegedly false statements in his grand jury testimony.
- The district court dismissed the perjury indictment as the product of an unlawful material-witness detention and suppressed the grand jury testimony and other evidence, citing defects in the warrant affidavit and Fourth Amendment violations.
- The United States appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 3144 authorizes arrest and detention of a material witness to secure testimony in a grand jury investigation.
2. Whether applying § 3144 to detain a grand jury witness violates the Fourth Amendment or other constitutional protections.
3. Whether alleged misstatements or omissions in the warrant affidavit required invalidation of the material witness warrant under *Franks* principles.
4. Whether the exclusionary rule required suppression of grand jury testimony and related evidence, and dismissal of the perjury indictment, as “fruit” of unlawful detention or searches.

## Decision

- The Second Circuit reversed the district court and reinstated the perjury indictment.
- The court held that § 3144 applies to grand jury proceedings as a “criminal proceeding.”
- The court held § 3144 constitutional as applied, emphasizing statutory safeguards and judicial supervision.
- The court concluded that the warrant affidavit, even after removing challenged statements, established probable cause that Awadallah’s testimony was material and that subpoena alone might be impracticable.
- The court reversed suppression of Awadallah’s grand jury testimony, statements, and physical evidence, rejecting dismissal and suppression based on “fruit of the poisonous tree” reasoning in this perjury prosecution.

## Legal Principles

- A grand jury investigation qualifies as a “criminal proceeding” for purposes of the federal material witness statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3144.
- Material-witness detention may satisfy the Fourth Amendment when supported by probable cause that the witness’s testimony is material and that securing the witness’s presence by subpoena may be impracticable, with detention governed by Bail Reform Act release provisions and § 3144’s deposition/necessity limits.
- Under *Franks*-type analysis, a warrant is not invalidated if, after excising materially false statements and accounting for material omissions, the remaining affidavit still establishes probable cause.
- The exclusionary rule is a remedial doctrine aimed at deterrence; it does not automatically require suppression of grand jury testimony or dismissal of perjury charges based on alleged illegality in obtaining the testimony, particularly where suppression would impose high truth-finding costs and limited deterrent benefit.

## Conclusion

The Second Circuit held that § 3144 authorizes detention of material witnesses to secure grand jury testimony and, on the record presented, the warrant was supported by probable cause and the challenged evidence and testimony were not suppressible in the perjury case, requiring reversal of dismissal and suppression and reinstatement of the indictment.


United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003)