## Facts

- Clifford Bailey, Ronald Clifton Cooley, and Ralph Walker were held at the District of Columbia Jail’s New Detention Center (“Northeast One”).
- Bailey and Walker had been transferred from federal prisons to the D.C. Jail pursuant to Superior Court writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum.
- Cooley was serving a federal sentence while confined at the D.C. Jail.
- In the early morning of August 26, 1976, all three left the facility without authorization.
- They were charged and convicted by a jury of escape under 18 U.S.C. § 751(a), based on an indictment alleging escape “from the custody of the Attorney General” by virtue of their federal convictions.
- At trial, defendants sought to introduce evidence of threats, assaults, and dangerous jail conditions to show their departure was compelled and to support defenses of duress/necessity and to contest criminal intent.
- The district court applied a strict necessity framework that required, among other things, prompt surrender after reaching safety; because defendants did not surrender, the court limited the use of the jail-conditions evidence and did not permit the jury to consider a necessity defense.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial court erred by excluding or limiting evidence of threats, assaults, and jail conditions in a way that prevented the jury from considering (a) whether defendants had the required mens rea for escape and (b) whether duress or necessity excused or justified the departure.
2. Whether the proof and jury instructions adequately established and explained the statutory element that defendants were in the “custody of the Attorney General” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 751(a).

## Decision

- The D.C. Circuit reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial.
- The court held the jury was not properly instructed on what constitutes an “escape” and the related mens rea.
- The court held evidence of threats, assaults, and dangerous jail conditions was relevant to intent and a duress-type theory and should not have been kept from the jury through a rigid threshold test.
- The court held the jury instructions inadequately explained the “custody of the Attorney General” element as applied to defendants housed in the D.C. Jail, including those present under habeas writs.

## Legal Principles

- Escape under 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) requires a voluntary, intentional leaving of custody without authorization; evidence bearing on voluntariness and intent is relevant to guilt.
- Evidence of coercive conditions (including threats and assaults) may be admissible to contest mens rea and to support duress or necessity in an escape prosecution.
- A trial court may not treat a strict, conjunctive set of necessity prerequisites—such as an automatic requirement of prompt surrender—as a categorical bar to presenting a duress/necessity theory or related evidence to the jury.
- The government must prove, and the jury must be properly instructed on, the statutory custody element, including what it means to be in the “custody of the Attorney General” when a federal prisoner is confined in a local facility or is present under a writ.

## Conclusion

The appellate court ordered a new trial because the jury was prevented from considering evidence central to intent and duress/necessity, and because the instructions did not adequately define “escape” or explain how to determine whether defendants were in federal custody under § 751(a).


United States v. Bailey, 585 F.2d 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1978)