## Facts

- A University of Michigan undergraduate posted a graphic fictional story on an Internet newsgroup depicting abduction, torture, rape, and murder, using the real name of a female classmate.
- The government’s prosecution ultimately proceeded only on private e-mail exchanges, not the public story.
- In December 1994, the defendant in Michigan exchanged e-mails with a correspondent in Canada describing sexually explicit fantasies involving violence against women and girls.
- The e-mails were sent privately to a single recipient and did not communicate with, or direct messages to, the classmate or any other identified target.
- A grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging five counts under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) based solely on the e-mails.
- The defendant moved to quash (dismiss) the superseding indictment for failure to allege communications containing “threats” within the meaning of § 875(c).

## Issues

1. Whether the charged e-mails, considered on their own, constituted “communication[s] containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another” under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).
2. Whether interpreting § 875(c) to reach these e-mails would extend the statute to protected speech rather than unprotected “true threats,” raising First Amendment concerns.

## Decision

- The court granted the motion to quash and dismissed the superseding indictment.
- It held that the e-mails, though disturbing, did not constitute “true threats” and therefore did not fall within § 875(c).
- The court construed § 875(c) narrowly to avoid criminalizing private fantasy communications not reasonably understood as serious expressions of intent to kidnap or injure an identifiable person.

## Legal Principles

- A “threat” under § 875(c) is limited to “true threats,” not mere expressions of violent desire, hyperbole, or fantasy.
- Courts apply an objective inquiry: whether the communication would be understood by a reasonable recipient as a serious expression of an intent to inflict bodily harm.
- Factors bearing on whether speech is a “true threat” include the audience and context (private correspondence vs. directed warning), whether the message targets an identifiable person, and whether it contains coercive features such as demands, ultimatums, or intimidation.
- When statutory interpretation intersects with speech regulation, courts may construe a threats statute narrowly to avoid reaching protected expression.

## Conclusion

The court dismissed the § 875(c) indictment because the charged private e-mails were not reasonably read as serious communications of intent to kidnap or injure and therefore did not qualify as “true threats” within the statute.


United States v. Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Mich. 1995)