## Facts

- After the Pentagon Papers leak, a White House special investigations unit sought information about Daniel Ellsberg.
- Ellsberg’s psychiatrist, Dr. Lewis J. Fielding, would not provide Ellsberg’s records to the FBI.
- E. Howard Hunt organized a covert break-in of Dr. Fielding’s office to search for Ellsberg’s psychiatric file.
- Hunt recruited Bernard L. Barker and Eugenio R. Martinez, both experienced in clandestine government-related operations.
- Hunt represented that the operation was authorized at a “White House level,” had authority greater than the FBI or CIA, and was justified by national security concerns.
- Hunt supplied disguises, equipment, and detailed instructions; Barker and Martinez carried out the entry and search but did not find the file.
- The government charged Barker and Martinez with conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 241 for conspiring to violate Dr. Fielding’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches.
- A jury convicted them; the district court declined to permit a reliance/mistake-of-law theory and refused requested jury instructions reflecting that defense.

## Issues

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 241 requires proof that the conspirators’ predominant purpose was to violate civil rights, or instead requires only that they intentionally agreed to conduct they knew would interfere with a federally protected right.
2. Whether defendants may present a good-faith, reasonable reliance theory based on apparent governmental authorization, and whether excluding evidence and jury instructions on that theory requires reversal.

## Decision

- The D.C. Circuit reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial.
- The court unanimously rejected the argument that § 241 requires a “predominant purpose” to violate civil rights; an intentional agreement to engage in conduct known to interfere with a federal right suffices even if the rights violation is incidental to another objective.
- A divided court held the defendants were entitled to present evidence and receive proper jury instructions on a reliance-based defense; the district court’s refusal prevented the jury from considering their theory of the case.
- One judge would have affirmed, reasoning that reliance on assurances from a subordinate official could not excuse participation in an obviously unlawful burglary.

## Legal Principles

- Under 18 U.S.C. § 241, the specific-intent element is satisfied when defendants intentionally agree to a course of conduct they know will interfere with a federally protected right; the rights deprivation need not be the conspiracy’s predominant objective.
- A defendant is generally entitled to present evidence and obtain jury instructions supporting a legally recognized theory of defense when there is evidentiary support for it.
- In this context, reliance-related defenses were treated as potentially available where defendants claim good-faith, objectively reasonable belief that a government official authorized the conduct, though the panel did not settle on a single doctrinal label (e.g., apparent public authority vs. reliance on an official interpretation of law).

## Conclusion

The court held that § 241 does not require a predominant civil-rights purpose, but reversed because the defendants were denied a fair opportunity to have the jury consider their reliance-based defense and supporting evidence.


United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1976)