## Facts

- Federal prosecutors charged William E. Baroni, Jr. (a senior Port Authority of New York and New Jersey official) and Bridget Anne Kelly (a senior official in the New Jersey Governor’s Office) in a nine-count indictment arising from the September 2013 “Bridgegate” lane closures at the George Washington Bridge’s Fort Lee, New Jersey access lanes.
- The indictment alleged defendants used governmental authority to reduce and reassign Fort Lee’s local access lanes and implemented the change as part of a purported “traffic study,” while concealing that the lane changes were undertaken to punish or retaliate against Fort Lee’s mayor for not supporting the Governor’s reelection effort.
- The lane reconfiguration allegedly caused severe traffic congestion in Fort Lee and interfered with residents’ customary commuting route to the bridge.
- The indictment included: conspiracy and substantive counts under 18 U.S.C. § 666 (theft or bribery concerning programs receiving federal funds), conspiracy and substantive wire-fraud counts under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1349, and civil-rights counts under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242.
- As to the fraud and § 666 counts, the government alleged, among other things, that defendants misapplied or converted Port Authority resources by directing Port Authority personnel and other agency resources to implement and maintain the lane changes and collect data for the supposed study.
- Counts 8 and 9 (civil-rights counts) alleged a conspiracy against rights (§ 241) and a substantive deprivation of rights (§ 242), based on the theory that defendants, acting under color of law and willfully, deprived Fort Lee residents of a constitutional right to local travel on public roadways free from illegitimate government interference.
- Defendants moved to dismiss the indictment under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(B), arguing the indictment failed to state offenses, that the statutes were impermissibly vague as applied or otherwise failed to give fair notice, and that the asserted “local travel” right was not a constitutional right (or was not clearly established).

## Issues

1. Whether, accepting the indictment’s allegations as true, the indictment sufficiently stated offenses and gave adequate notice under Rule 7 and Rule 12.
2. Whether defendants’ as-applied vagueness and fair-notice challenges could be resolved on a pretrial motion to dismiss on the face of the indictment.
3. Whether the indictment adequately alleged “property” and other required elements for the § 666 and wire-fraud counts based on the alleged diversion and misuse of Port Authority employee labor and resources for a sham traffic study.
4. Whether the indictment adequately alleged civil-rights offenses under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 by pleading a willful deprivation, under color of law, of a constitutional right to local (intrastate) travel free from illegitimate government interference.

## Decision

- The court denied defendants’ Rule 12 motions to dismiss the indictment in full.
- The court held the indictment satisfied pleading requirements because it set out the essential facts and elements of the charged offenses and provided adequate notice to prepare a defense and to plead double jeopardy.
- The court declined to dismiss on as-applied vagueness and fair-notice grounds at the pretrial stage, reasoning that such challenges generally depend on the defendants’ actual conduct and a developed factual record rather than the indictment alone.
- The court held the indictment sufficiently alleged the fraud and § 666 counts, including the government’s asserted property interests in Port Authority resources and the labor of Port Authority personnel allegedly diverted to execute and maintain the lane closures and related activities.
- The court held the indictment sufficiently alleged the civil-rights counts under §§ 241 and 242, concluding that, at the pleading stage, the allegations plausibly invoked a federally protected liberty interest in freedom of movement that could apply to local travel in the circumstances alleged, and that the indictment adequately pled willfulness and action under color of law.

## Legal Principles

- An indictment is sufficient if it (1) contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs the defendant of the charge, and (2) enables the defendant to plead an acquittal or conviction to bar future prosecutions for the same offense.
- On a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, the court generally accepts the indictment’s factual allegations as true and does not decide whether the government can prove those allegations at trial.
- As-applied void-for-vagueness and fair-notice challenges commonly require evaluation of the defendant’s conduct in context and therefore often are not suitable for resolution solely from the indictment at the pretrial stage (absent special circumstances).
- For federal fraud and § 666 charges, the indictment must allege the statutory elements, including (as applicable) a scheme to defraud or misapply property; at the pleading stage, allegations that public employee labor and agency resources were wrongfully diverted or misused may suffice to plead a property-based theory.
- For 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242, the government must allege (and later prove) interference with a federally secured right; § 242 also requires action under color of law and willfulness. At the pleading stage, allegations of an intentional, punitive obstruction of local travel may be sufficient to plead a protected liberty interest in freedom of movement.

## Conclusion

The district court denied dismissal of the Bridgegate indictment, ruling that the charging document adequately pled the essential elements and facts for the § 666, wire-fraud, and civil-rights counts, rejecting pretrial vagueness and fair-notice challenges as premature on the indictment alone, and permitting the government to proceed on its theories that defendants misused Port Authority resources and willfully interfered with residents’ local travel rights under color of law.


United States v. Baroni, 2016 WL 3388302 (2016)