## Facts

- Police officers on patrol in a Puerto Rico public housing project around 11 p.m. observed Jaime Bauzó-Santiago near a black Mercedes-Benz SUV.
- An officer testified he saw Bauzó remove a nickel-plated pistol from his waistband, throw it into the SUV, and walk away.
- The officer asked whether Bauzó had a license to carry a firearm; Bauzó said he did not.
- The officer returned with Bauzó to the SUV, opened an unlocked driver-side door, and recovered a loaded Taurus .380 pistol.
- Bauzó was arrested and, after receiving Miranda warnings at the station, admitted he possessed the gun for protection because he sold jewelry and clothing.
- Police recovered jewelry and clothing from the vehicle during an inventory search.
- A federal grand jury charged Bauzó with being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
- While detained pretrial, Bauzó wrote a letter to the district judge complaining about appointed counsel, requesting new counsel, and stating he had accepted responsibility for his guilt while seeking a “reasonable” sentence.
- The district court permitted counsel to withdraw and appointed new counsel; no plea agreement was reached and the case proceeded to trial.
- Over the defense’s objection, the district court admitted the letter at trial; the jury convicted Bauzó.

## Issues

1. Whether the defendant’s letter to the district judge was inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 410(a)(4) and Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(f) as a statement made during plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority.
2. Whether the trial evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

## Decision

- The First Circuit affirmed the conviction.
- The court held the letter was not protected by Rule 410(a)(4) or Rule 11(f) because it was not made during plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority.
- The court rejected constitutional challenges to admitting the letter, concluding it was a voluntary, defendant-initiated communication and not the product of governmental coercion or improper interference with counsel.
- The court held the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find knowing possession, relying on the officer’s eyewitness account, the recovered firearm, and the defendant’s post-Miranda admission.

## Legal Principles

- Rule 410(a)(4) excludes statements made during plea discussions only when the discussions are with an attorney for the prosecuting authority; unilateral statements to a judge are outside the rule’s text.
- Whether a statement is made “in the course of plea discussions” depends on context, including the audience (prosecutor vs. court) and whether the statement occurred as part of negotiation rather than a separate request (e.g., a request for new counsel).
- A defendant’s voluntary, unsolicited communication to the court may be admitted as evidence of guilt absent coercion or constitutional violation.
- In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and does not reweigh credibility determinations made by the jury.

## Conclusion

The First Circuit affirmed a felon-in-possession conviction, holding that a defendant’s pro se letter to the judge acknowledging guilt and seeking leniency was not a protected plea-discussion statement under Rule 410 and that eyewitness testimony, firearm recovery, and a post-Miranda admission provided sufficient proof of knowing possession.


United States v. Bauzó-Santiago, 867 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2017)