## Facts

- Donzell Wayne Biggs, a federal prisoner serving a life sentence, was housed in administrative segregation at USP Lompoc.
- In that unit, inmates were confined most of the day and periodically escorted (handcuffed) to a recreation cage in groups.
- While in a recreation cage with other inmates, Biggs stabbed inmate Michael Smith with an approximately 8-inch homemade knife, injuring Smith’s arm and ear.
- Biggs asserted he acted in self-defense, proffering that he knew Smith had been trying to obtain a knife and that Smith threatened him on the way to the recreation cage.
- Biggs was charged with assault with a dangerous weapon (18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(3)) and possession of prison contraband (18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(2)).
- Before trial, the district court held Biggs had not made a prima facie showing of self-defense because he had not shown there were “no reasonable alternatives to the use of force,” and it barred self-defense evidence and argument.
- Biggs entered a conditional guilty plea preserving his right to appeal the order excluding the self-defense theory and received an 84-month sentence on the new charges.

## Issues

1. Whether the district court erred by defining self-defense to require proof that there were “no reasonable alternatives to the use of force” before the defense could be presented to a jury.
2. Whether Biggs’s proffer was sufficient under the correct self-defense standard to permit him to introduce self-defense evidence and argument.

## Decision

- The Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction and remanded.
- The court held the district court committed legal error by adding a third requirement (“no reasonable alternatives”) to the Ninth Circuit’s self-defense standard.
- The court held that, under the correct standard, Biggs’s proffer was sufficient to allow a jury to consider self-defense; the appellate court did not decide that self-defense was established as a matter of law.

## Legal Principles

- In a federal criminal case in the Ninth Circuit, a prima facie case of self-defense requires an offer of proof of two elements: (1) a reasonable belief that force was necessary to defend against the immediate use of unlawful force, and (2) use of no more force than was reasonably necessary in the circumstances.
- A court may not require, as a condition to presenting self-defense, an additional showing that the defendant lacked reasonable alternatives to using force.
- When a defendant makes a prima facie showing under the governing self-defense test, the defendant is entitled to present self-defense evidence and argument to the jury.

## Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit reversed because the district court misdefined self-defense by imposing a “no reasonable alternatives” prerequisite, improperly preventing Biggs from presenting a self-defense theory; the case was remanded for proceedings applying the correct two-element self-defense standard.


United States v. Biggs, 441 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006)