## Facts

- Donald Biggs was federally indicted for sex offenses involving minors.
- Biggs’s jury trial was scheduled to begin on December 4, 2017.
- Biggs’s then-current attorney was appointed on May 9, 2017 and was Biggs’s third appointed counsel.
- In mid-August 2017, defense counsel began plea negotiations with the government.
- While plea discussions continued, Biggs and the government jointly moved to extend deadlines for pretrial filings.
- Near the end of October 2017, the government made a plea proposal that required approval from a senior supervisor.
- On October 30, defense counsel was told the proposal was not approved.
- After the proposal fell through, the parties again jointly moved to extend the pretrial-filing deadline.
- Biggs separately moved to continue the December 2017 trial date for about 90 days and asked the court to exclude the continuance period under the Speedy Trial Act.
- The government opposed continuing the trial date.

## Issues

1. Should the court continue Biggs’s December 4, 2017 trial date for approximately 90 days over the government’s objection?
2. If the trial is continued, should the resulting delay be excluded from the Speedy Trial Act calculation as an ends-of-justice continuance under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)?

## Decision

- The court granted Biggs’s motion to continue the trial date.
- The court found that the ends of justice served by a limited continuance outweighed the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
- The court excluded the period of the continuance from the Speedy Trial Act clock under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7).

## Legal Principles

- The Speedy Trial Act generally requires a federal criminal trial to begin within 70 days of indictment or the defendant’s first appearance, subject to statutory exclusions. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1).
- A court may exclude delay caused by a continuance only if it makes on-the-record findings that the ends of justice served by granting the continuance outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A).
- Party agreement, consent, or waiver does not by itself stop the Speedy Trial Act clock; the court must independently evaluate the request and state its reasons on the record, tied to a defined period.
- In deciding whether to grant an ends-of-justice continuance, a court may consider whether denying the continuance would deny defense counsel reasonable time for effective preparation, including where counsel was recently appointed and the case requires substantial preparation. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv).
- Ongoing plea discussions and late changes in expected case posture may support a short continuance when additional time is needed for trial preparation and case evaluation, so long as the court balances that need against the public interest in prompt resolution.

## Conclusion

United States v. Biggs (I) held that a 90-day continuance of a December 2017 trial was warranted despite government opposition, and that the resulting delay was excludable under the Speedy Trial Act because the court found, on the record, that additional preparation time for defense counsel in light of the case’s demands and recent plea developments outweighed the competing interest in a speedy trial for that limited period.


United States v. Biggs (I), 2017 WL 5599467 (2017)