## Facts

- Following a 2010 explosion at the Upper Big Branch mine in West Virginia that killed 29 miners, federal prosecutors charged Donald L. Blankenship, Massey Energy’s former CEO, with conspiracy to willfully violate mandatory federal mine safety and health standards.
- The government’s case alleged Blankenship knowingly tolerated pervasive safety violations at the mine and prioritized production over compliance.
- A jury convicted Blankenship of the conspiracy count under 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 30 U.S.C. § 820(d), and he received a one-year sentence.
- After trial, the government produced materials it had not disclosed before trial, including (1) memoranda of interviews of seven Massey employees and (2) internal MSHA emails and documents, some reflecting hostility toward Massey and Blankenship.
- Blankenship sought post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing the nondisclosures violated Brady and Giglio because the materials were favorable and material to his defense and impeachment of government witnesses.

## Issues

1. Whether the government suppressed favorable evidence within the meaning of Brady and Giglio.
2. Whether the suppressed interview memoranda and MSHA internal communications were material—i.e., whether there was a reasonable probability that disclosure would have changed the verdict when assessed cumulatively.

## Decision

- The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of § 2255 relief.
- The court accepted that the government improperly failed to disclose materials that should have been produced under DOJ discovery policies.
- The court held, however, that the suppressed materials were not material under Brady/Giglio because they did not create a reasonable probability of a different result.
- Considering the full trial record and the cumulative effect of the suppressed evidence, the court concluded the nondisclosures did not undermine confidence in the conspiracy conviction.

## Legal Principles

- Brady and Giglio require disclosure of favorable evidence, including impeachment material, only when it is material to guilt or punishment.
- Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had it been disclosed, the outcome would have been different; a reasonable probability is one sufficient to undermine confidence in the verdict.
- Materiality must be evaluated cumulatively across all suppressed evidence, not item-by-item.
- Evidence that is merely helpful, cumulative of themes already presented, or only marginally useful for impeachment generally does not satisfy Brady materiality, particularly when the trial evidence supporting conviction is strong.
- For a conspiracy to willfully violate mine-safety standards, materials aimed at shifting blame to the regulator or showing regulator hostility may have limited significance if they do not substantially weaken proof of the defendant’s knowing tolerance of violations.

## Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit held that, although the government improperly withheld certain interview memoranda and internal MSHA communications, the nondisclosures were not material under Brady/Giglio when weighed against the trial record and assessed cumulatively, so Blankenship was not entitled to vacatur of his conviction under § 2255.


United States v. Blankenship, 19 F.4th 685 (4th Cir. 2021)