## Facts

- Archie W. Brawner was convicted in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia of second-degree murder and carrying a dangerous weapon.
- On appeal, the principal dispute concerned Brawner’s insanity defense and the governing legal standard for criminal responsibility.
- After argument before a panel, the D.C. Circuit ordered rehearing en banc to reconsider the District’s insanity doctrine and received extensive amicus participation.
- The case served as the vehicle for deciding whether to retain the Durham “product” test or adopt the American Law Institute (ALI) Model Penal Code formulation.

## Issues

1. Whether the District of Columbia should abandon the Durham “product of mental disease or defect” test for insanity.
2. Whether the court should adopt the ALI Model Penal Code standard for lack of criminal responsibility due to mental disease or defect.
3. How to define “mental disease or defect” and regulate the use of expert testimony and prior antisocial conduct evidence in insanity litigation.
4. Whether the newly adopted insanity standard should apply prospectively and what remedy, if any, was appropriate for Brawner’s conviction.

## Decision

- The en banc court adopted ALI Model Penal Code § 4.01(1) as the insanity standard for all trials beginning after the decision date.
- The court abandoned Durham and held it would no longer govern criminal responsibility in the District of Columbia.
- The court retained the McDonald definition of “mental disease or defect.”
- The court reaffirmed that experts may testify on diagnosis and functional capacities, but the ultimate responsibility determination remains for the jury, with trial administration aimed at preventing expert domination.
- The court limited reliance on prior criminal or antisocial acts as proof of mental disease absent expert support connecting such conduct to an underlying mental disease.
- The case was remanded for the district court to determine whether the judgment should stand or whether a new trial should be granted in light of the doctrinal change.

## Legal Principles

- A defendant is not responsible for criminal conduct if, at the time of the conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, the defendant lacked substantial capacity either (a) to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct or (b) to conform the conduct to the requirements of law.
- Durham’s “product” formulation is rejected as an operative test for insanity in the District of Columbia.
- “Mental disease or defect” includes any abnormal condition of the mind that substantially affects mental or emotional processes and substantially impairs behavioral controls (McDonald definition).
- Evidence of prior antisocial or criminal conduct is not, by itself, probative of mental disease; such use generally requires expert testimony linking the conduct pattern to a medically recognized inference of underlying mental disease.
- Expert testimony is admissible and often necessary on mental condition and functional impairment, but criminal responsibility is a legal judgment assigned to the jury; trial courts should manage proofs and instructions to prevent experts from controlling the verdict.
- A newly announced insanity standard may be applied prospectively, with case-specific relief determined on remand rather than by automatic reversal.

## Conclusion

The D.C. Circuit replaced the Durham insanity doctrine with the ALI Model Penal Code standard, kept a broad definition of qualifying mental disease, imposed limits designed to reduce expert control over the responsibility determination, and remanded for the district court to decide whether Brawner’s conviction should stand or a new trial should be ordered under the revised doctrine.


United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc)