## Facts

- Bronx Reptiles, Inc. operated as a commercial importer and wholesale distributor of animals.
- A U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service inspector examined an airline cargo shipment arriving at John F. Kennedy International Airport from the Solomon Islands and consigned to Bronx Reptiles.
- The shipment consisted of two wooden boxes containing skinks and frogs.
- In one box, frogs were confined in a small compartment, tightly packed; many appeared dead or in severe distress, and a significant number were dead.
- Bronx Reptiles’ employee met the inspector at the cargo facility and provided import-entry paperwork.
- The government prosecuted Bronx Reptiles under 18 U.S.C. § 42(c) (Lacey Act), alleging it knowingly caused or permitted wild animals to be transported to the United States under inhumane or unhealthful conditions.
- After a bench trial, a magistrate judge convicted Bronx Reptiles; the district court affirmed.
- The magistrate judge found there was no evidence that Bronx Reptiles knew the conditions of packing and transport were inhumane or unhealthful.

## Issues

1. Under 18 U.S.C. § 42(c), must the government prove the defendant knew the animals were transported under “inhumane or unhealthful” conditions, or only that the defendant knowingly caused or permitted transportation to the United States?

## Decision

- The Second Circuit reversed the conviction and remanded with instructions to enter a judgment of not guilty.
- The court held that § 42(c) requires proof that the defendant knew the conditions of transportation were inhumane or unhealthful.
- Because the trial court found no evidence of such knowledge, the government failed to prove an essential element of the offense.
- One judge dissented.

## Legal Principles

- When a federal criminal statute uses “knowingly,” courts often read the mens rea to apply to the offense’s material elements, including attendant circumstances that make the conduct unlawful.
- Under 18 U.S.C. § 42(c), the government must prove both: (1) the defendant knowingly caused or permitted transportation of wild animals to the United States, and (2) the defendant knew the transportation occurred under inhumane or unhealthful conditions.
- Ambiguity in a criminal statute’s mens rea scope is generally resolved in favor of requiring clearer proof of culpable mental state.

## Conclusion

The Second Circuit construed § 42(c) to require subjective knowledge of the inhumane or unhealthful transport conditions, and it ordered acquittal because the government proved transportation but not the importer’s knowledge of the conditions.


United States v. Bronx Reptiles, Inc., 217 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2000)