## Facts

- The United States prosecuted James Harvey Brown and Alfred C. Brown in a high-profile federal corruption/bribery case in the Middle District of Louisiana connected to casino licensing; former Louisiana Governor Edwin Edwards featured as an unindicted co-conspirator and witness.
- Citing notoriety and record evidence of interference risks in related matters (including alleged witness tampering, bribery, and obstruction), the district court granted the government’s request to empanel an anonymous jury and withheld juror names and identifying information from public disclosure.
- News organizations sought to intervene and moved to vacate the anonymous-jury order or, alternatively, to obtain juror identities at least after the verdict.
- The district court declined to rescind juror anonymity and deferred ruling on the alternative request for post-verdict disclosure.
- While the media motion remained pending, the district court entered an additional order prohibiting the media from attempting to “circumvent” anonymity by independent investigation and reporting aimed at identifying jurors.
- The trial judge informed jurors their identities would not be disclosed without their consent and instructed them not to discuss deliberations absent a court order, while permitting general reactions to the trial.
- No juror consented to disclosure.
- The media pursued an interlocutory appeal challenging both the anonymous-jury regime and the anti-investigation order as violating the First Amendment and access principles.

## Issues

1. Whether the First Amendment (and any common-law access right) required disclosure of juror identities, and whether the district court made sufficient, case-specific findings to justify an anonymous jury during and after trial.
2. Whether an order prohibiting the press from independently investigating or reporting to identify jurors constituted an impermissible prior restraint on speech and newsgathering.

## Decision

- The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s use of an anonymous jury on the record presented, holding that the findings and measures were permissible to protect juror safety, privacy, and trial integrity.
- The Fifth Circuit reversed or vacated the district court’s broad prohibition on media efforts to identify jurors through lawful, independent means, treating it as an unconstitutional prior restraint insufficiently justified and not narrowly tailored.
- The overall disposition was affirmed in part and reversed in part.

## Legal Principles

- The First Amendment provides a qualified right of access to criminal proceedings and related information, but it does not create a categorical right to jurors’ names and addresses in every case.
- A court may withhold juror identities when supported by specific, record-based findings showing a substantial risk to juror safety, juror privacy, or the fairness and integrity of the trial, and when the restriction is narrowly tailored.
- Protecting jurors from intimidation or harassment, including after service ends, is a legitimate governmental interest that can justify limiting disclosure of identifying information.
- Prior restraints on speech and publication carry a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality; orders restricting press newsgathering and dissemination of lawfully obtained truthful information require a compelling justification and narrow tailoring in scope and duration.
- Court authority to protect the secrecy of jury deliberations permits limits directed to preserving deliberative confidentiality, but broad orders aimed at restricting press investigation extend beyond controlling court records and face strict First Amendment scrutiny.

## Conclusion

The Fifth Circuit permitted juror anonymity in an exceptional, high-risk public corruption prosecution based on specific findings tied to juror protection and trial integrity, but it rejected a sweeping order that barred the press from independently identifying jurors as a constitutionally suspect prior restraint lacking adequate tailoring and justification.


United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 907 (5th Cir. 2001)