## Facts

- Edward J. Brown was charged in federal court for conduct tied to a multi-state methamphetamine operation.
- A grand jury indicted Brown for (1) methamphetamine conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), 846; (2) using a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1); and (3) felon in possession under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 924(a)(2).
- After pleading not guilty, Brown obtained a psychological examination by Dr. Fred Lindberg and filed notice of intent to assert an insanity defense under Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.2(a).
- Brown proffered that Lindberg would testify Brown suffered from PTSD and related conditions that impaired Brown’s ability to make “correct choices” and conform his conduct to the law.
- The government moved in limine to exclude the expert testimony; the district court granted the motion, finding the proffer did not satisfy the federal insanity standard and was not tied to the mens rea elements of the charged offenses.
- The district court invited a more specific proffer linking the mental-condition evidence to Brown’s mental state at the time of the offenses; Brown did not provide a sufficient element-focused linkage.
- Brown entered a conditional guilty plea to the conspiracy count and the § 924(c) count, preserving the right to appeal the exclusion; the government dismissed the felon-in-possession count.
- The court imposed 121 months on the conspiracy count plus 60 consecutive months on the § 924(c) count, and also imposed a fine and supervised release.

## Issues

1. Whether the district court erred in excluding Lindberg’s testimony as insufficient to support an insanity defense under 18 U.S.C. § 17 because it addressed inability to conform conduct rather than inability to appreciate wrongfulness.
2. Whether the excluded testimony was independently admissible to negate the mens rea of the charged offenses, and whether its exclusion violated Brown’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to due process and to present a defense.
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion in excluding the expert evidence as irrelevant or insufficiently connected to the statutory elements.

## Decision

- The Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment and the evidentiary ruling excluding the mental-condition expert testimony.
- The court held the proffered testimony did not meet the Insanity Defense Reform Act’s cognitive standard because it primarily described volitional impairment.
- Assuming mental-condition evidence may be admissible to negate specific intent in appropriate cases, the court held Brown failed to show a concrete nexus between the proposed testimony and the mens rea elements of the conspiracy and § 924(c) offenses.
- The court concluded exclusion of the testimony did not violate Brown’s constitutional right to present a defense because the right is subject to reasonable relevance and admissibility limits.
- The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s exclusion of the evidence.

## Legal Principles

- Under 18 U.S.C. § 17, federal insanity is a narrow cognitive test requiring proof (by clear and convincing evidence) that a severe mental disease or defect rendered the defendant unable to appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of the acts; inability to conform conduct to law is not enough.
- Psychological or psychiatric evidence offered to negate mens rea must be directly tied to the particular mental-state element(s) of the charged offense; generalized claims of impaired self-control or poor decision-making are insufficient.
- Federal law does not permit a free-standing diminished-capacity theory that seeks mitigation based on reduced blameworthiness rather than negation of an offense element.
- Excluding defense evidence does not violate the Fifth or Sixth Amendments when the exclusion rests on ordinary evidentiary limits such as relevance and fit to legally recognized defenses.

## Conclusion

The Tenth Circuit upheld Brown’s convictions and sentence, ruling that expert testimony describing PTSD-based difficulty resisting wrongdoing did not satisfy the federal insanity standard and, absent a specific element-by-element connection to mens rea, was properly excluded without violating Brown’s right to present a defense.


United States v. Brown, 326 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2003)