## Facts

- The United States prosecuted Korrigan Brown for crimes arising from the armed robbery of two stores.
- Brown was charged under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and under 18 U.S.C. § 924 for firearm-related counts tied to the robberies.
- Neither § 1951 nor § 924 makes a defendant’s sanity an element the government must prove to obtain a conviction.
- Brown did not dispute that he committed the robberies but pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity.
- At trial, two mental-health witnesses testified that Brown suffered from bipolar disorder (manic-depressive illness).
- Brown asked the district court to instruct the jury that, to convict, the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Brown was not insane at the time of the robberies.
- The district court declined Brown’s proposed instruction and instead instructed the jury using 18 U.S.C. § 17, as amended by the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 (IDRA).
- Under that instruction, the jury was told that Brown bore the burden to prove insanity by clear and convincing evidence—described as showing a high probability that, at the time of the offenses, a severe mental disease or defect prevented him from appreciating the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his acts.
- The jury found Brown guilty on all counts, and the district court entered judgment.
- Brown appealed, arguing that § 17(b)’s burden allocation violated due process by relieving the government of its obligation to prove every element of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.

## Issues

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 17(b), which requires a defendant to prove insanity by clear and convincing evidence, violates due process by improperly shifting to the defendant part of the government’s burden to prove the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. Whether the district court erred by refusing Brown’s requested instruction that the government must disprove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt and by instructing the jury under § 17.

## Decision

- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Brown’s convictions.
- The court rejected Brown’s due process challenge to § 17(b), concluding that placing the burden on the defendant to prove the affirmative defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence is constitutionally permissible.
- The court held that the district court properly instructed the jury consistent with § 17 and properly declined to give an instruction that would have shifted the burden of proving sanity to the government.

## Legal Principles

- Due process requires the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each statutory element of a charged federal offense.
- Legislatures may treat insanity as an affirmative defense rather than an element of the offense, and may place the burden of proof for that defense on the defendant, so long as the government still must prove all elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Under the IDRA, 18 U.S.C. § 17(a), the insanity defense is limited to defendants who, at the time of the offense, were unable to appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of their acts because of a severe mental disease or defect.
- Under 18 U.S.C. § 17(b), the defendant bears the burden of proving insanity by clear and convincing evidence.
- When the charged statutes do not require proof of sanity as an element, instructing the jury that the defendant must prove insanity by clear and convincing evidence does not lessen the government’s burden to prove the offense elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
- A district court does not err by refusing a requested instruction that misstates the controlling burden of proof for the federal insanity defense.

## Conclusion

United States v. Brown upheld the constitutionality and application of the IDRA’s allocation of the burden of proof for insanity: because sanity is not an element of Hobbs Act robbery or the charged firearm offenses, requiring Brown to prove legal insanity by clear and convincing evidence did not violate due process, and the district court correctly instructed the jury under 18 U.S.C. § 17 and rejected Brown’s proposed instruction shifting the burden to the government.


United States v. Brown, 635 Fed. Appx. 574 (2015)