## Facts

- Federal agents investigated a crack-cocaine distribution operation run from an apartment in Westbrook, Maine, shared by Ryan Butterworth and Michael Lovely, after a tip from Lovely’s girlfriend.
- Agents conducted a “trash pull,” found drug-related evidence, obtained a search warrant, and searched the apartment.
- The search produced marijuana and crack cocaine, a scale with drug residue, and 5.04 grams of cocaine base concealed in a soda can.
- Butterworth and Lovely were indicted on federal drug-trafficking charges and tried jointly in the District of Maine.
- After the first day of trial, Lovely pleaded guilty; Butterworth moved for a mistrial, arguing prejudice from the plea. The district court denied the mistrial and gave a curative instruction that Lovely’s plea was not evidence against Butterworth.
- The government presented testimony from law enforcement and several lay witnesses describing drugs in the apartment and Butterworth’s role in sales and distribution.
- Witness Crystal Alexander, Butterworth’s occasional girlfriend, had given detailed sworn grand jury testimony describing the operation and Butterworth’s role based on firsthand observations.
- At trial, Alexander testified under compulsion but minimized or changed key details; the government used her grand jury testimony to refresh her recollection and, when inconsistent, as substantive evidence.
- Butterworth was convicted of possession with intent to distribute and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine and marijuana under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846.
- At sentencing, the judge found by a preponderance that Butterworth was responsible for 50 grams or more of cocaine base, triggering a higher mandatory minimum than the quantity seized.

## Issues

1. Whether Crystal Alexander’s sworn grand jury testimony was admissible as substantive evidence when inconsistent with her trial testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A).
2. Whether admission and use of Alexander’s grand jury testimony, given her reluctance and inconsistency at trial, violated the Confrontation Clause or denied a fair trial.
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying a mistrial after the codefendant pleaded guilty mid-trial and relying on a curative instruction.
4. Whether the Sixth Amendment required the jury (not the judge) to find drug quantity beyond a reasonable doubt when the finding increased the mandatory minimum sentence.

## Decision

- The First Circuit affirmed Butterworth’s convictions and sentence.
- The court upheld admission of Alexander’s grand jury testimony as non-hearsay prior inconsistent statements given under oath and admitted substantively under Rule 801(d)(1)(A).
- The court found no Confrontation Clause violation because Alexander testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination.
- The court held the district court acted within its discretion in denying a mistrial and that the curative instruction adequately addressed potential prejudice from the codefendant’s guilty plea.
- The court rejected Butterworth’s mandatory-minimum argument, holding that then-controlling precedent permitted judicial factfinding by a preponderance to raise a mandatory minimum so long as the sentence remained within the statutory maximum authorized by the verdict.

## Legal Principles

- A witness’s prior statement is admissible as non-hearsay and may be used substantively when it is (i) inconsistent with the witness’s trial testimony, (ii) given under oath in a grand jury proceeding, and (iii) the witness testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A).
- The Confrontation Clause is satisfied when the declarant appears at trial and is available for cross-examination, even if the witness is reluctant, evasive, or testifies under compulsion.
- Denial of a mistrial after a codefendant’s mid-trial guilty plea is reviewed for abuse of discretion; a prompt, clear curative instruction is generally presumed to cure potential prejudice absent a specific showing to the contrary.
- Under then-prevailing Sixth Amendment doctrine, a judge could find sentencing facts by a preponderance that increased a statutory mandatory minimum, provided the sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum authorized by the jury’s verdict.

## Conclusion

The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the government properly introduced a key witness’s prior sworn grand jury testimony as substantive evidence under Rule 801(d)(1)(A), that cross-examination at trial satisfied confrontation requirements, that a curative instruction adequately addressed any prejudice from the codefendant’s guilty plea, and that the sentencing judge could determine drug quantity by a preponderance to trigger a higher mandatory minimum under the law then in force.


United States v. Butterworth, 511 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. 2007)