## Facts

- James Thomson Callender, a journalist and pamphleteer, authored and published a book attacking President John Adams.
- The United States indicted Callender under the Sedition Act of 1798 for publishing allegedly “false, scandalous and malicious” statements intended to bring the President into contempt and disrepute.
- The indictment quoted passages characterizing Adams’s administration as a “continued tempest of malignant passions” and alleging Adams “never opened his lips, or lifted his pen without threatening and scolding.”
- Callender sought to defend on justification (truth), offering witness testimony (including Colonel John Taylor) to establish that parts of the publication’s assertions were true.
- Callender also argued that the Sedition Act was unconstitutional and that the jury could determine law as well as fact, including constitutional validity.
- The court made trial-level rulings on the sufficiency of the indictment, admissibility of justification evidence, the court–jury division of authority (including constitutional questions), juror challenges, and sentencing-related procedure for fines.

## Issues

1. Whether a criminal jury may decide that a federal statute is unconstitutional and therefore void.
2. Whether an indictment for seditious libel must identify the title of the book containing the alleged libel, and whether “tenor and effect” allegations require verbatim proof.
3. Whether a defendant invoking truth as justification must prove the whole alleged libelous charge, and whether partial proof by multiple witnesses is admissible.
4. What limits govern juror challenges for bias in a seditious libel prosecution, and who decides challenges to the array versus individual jurors.
5. Whether the jury or the court assesses any fine upon conviction under the Sedition Act.

## Decision

- The court held that the constitutionality of the Sedition Act was for the court alone; the jury could not treat the statute as void, and counsel could not argue unconstitutionality to the jury.
- The court upheld the indictment as sufficient without naming the book’s title and ruled that “tenor and effect” allegations required proof of substance rather than exact words.
- The court ruled that justification by truth had to extend to the whole charge; partial truth was insufficient and inadmissible.
- The court rejected attempts to prove the alleged libel through fragmented testimony addressing only parts of the charged passages, including proposed testimony that did not establish the full asserted characterization.
- The court limited juror questioning on challenges for favor to whether the juror had formed and expressed an opinion on the charge against the defendant (not merely on the book or its politics).
- The court distinguished challenges to the array (based on partiality of the sheriff and decided by the court) from individual challenges for favor (decided by triers).
- The court stated that assessment of a fine was for the court, not the jury; the case proceeded to conviction.

## Legal Principles

- In a federal criminal prosecution, a jury’s role does not include deciding whether an Act of Congress is unconstitutional; constitutional validity is a question for the court.
- In criminal libel pleadings, an indictment may set out the allegedly libelous passages “of the tenor and effect following” without identifying the publication’s title.
- When an indictment alleges “tenor and effect,” the prosecution need prove the substance of the charged statements, not an exact verbal match.
- A truth-based justification defense in a seditious libel prosecution requires proof of the entire libelous charge; partial justification is inadmissible.
- Juror challenges for favor properly focus on whether a juror has formed and expressed an opinion on the defendant’s charge; challenges to the array require showing partiality in the officer summoning the jury.
- Under the Sedition Act framework applied by the court, any fine is imposed by the court rather than assessed by the jury.

## Conclusion

The court treated constitutional validity as exclusively a judicial question, restricted the jury to applying the law as instructed, upheld flexible libel pleading and proof standards for “tenor and effect,” and imposed a demanding rule that truth justification must cover the entire charged libel, substantially limiting defense evidence in the Sedition Act prosecution.


United States v. Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239 (C.C.D. Va. 1800)