## Facts

- Ellen Campbell, a licensed North Carolina real estate agent, worked with Mark Lawing, who sought to purchase a Lake Norman house while representing himself as running a legitimate auto-customizing business.
- Over several weeks, Campbell showed Lawing multiple houses and had numerous phone contacts with him; Lawing displayed conspicuous wealth, including expensive cars and large amounts of cash.
- Lawing at one point showed Campbell a briefcase containing $20,000 in cash to demonstrate purchasing ability.
- Lawing agreed with the sellers on a purchase price of $182,500, but later proposed a split arrangement: $60,000 paid in cash “under the table” and a reduced recorded contract price of $122,500.
- Campbell relayed Lawing’s “under-the-table” proposal through the listing side, and the sellers accepted the arrangement.
- At closing, Lawing brought $60,000 in cash bundled in a grocery bag; Campbell attended the closing and received a small cash tip afterward.
- Evidence indicated Campbell expressed to a coworker that she suspected Lawing’s money might be drug proceeds.
- Campbell was convicted by a jury of money laundering (18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)) and engaging in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property (18 U.S.C. § 1957(a)).
- The district court granted a post-verdict judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 and conditionally granted a new trial under Rule 33; the government appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether sufficient evidence supported the § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) conviction, including proof that Campbell knew the funds were unlawful proceeds and knew the transaction was designed to conceal or disguise the proceeds’ nature, source, ownership, or control.
2. Whether sufficient evidence supported the § 1957(a) conviction for knowingly engaging in a monetary transaction over $10,000 involving criminally derived property.
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion in conditionally granting a new trial under Rule 33.

## Decision

- The court of appeals reversed the Rule 29 judgment of acquittal, holding a rational jury could find the elements of both § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and § 1957(a) beyond a reasonable doubt.
- The court held the evidence permitted a jury to infer Campbell’s knowledge of the illegal source from circumstantial evidence, including conspicuous cash, unusual payment methods, and her statement that the funds might be drug money.
- The court held the evidence also supported an inference that Campbell knew the cash-and-reduced-contract structure was designed to conceal or disguise the true amount and source of Lawing’s contribution by keeping $60,000 off recorded documents.
- The court affirmed the district court’s conditional grant of a new trial, finding no abuse of discretion under Rule 33’s “interest of justice” standard.
- The case was remanded for further proceedings.

## Legal Principles

- On review of a post-verdict judgment of acquittal, the question is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; appellate review defers to reasonable inferences and jury credibility choices.
- To prove money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), the government must show a financial transaction involving proceeds of specified unlawful activity, and that the defendant knew (1) the property was unlawful proceeds and (2) the transaction was designed, at least in part, to conceal or disguise attributes of those proceeds.
- The required knowledge under § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) may be established by circumstantial evidence and inference from the transaction’s structure and surrounding conduct.
- A reduced recorded purchase price combined with an unrecorded cash payment may support an inference of a concealment design because public records would not reflect the true amount and source of the buyer’s funds.
- Under 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a), a conviction requires proof that the defendant knowingly engaged in a monetary transaction over $10,000 involving criminally derived property; proof of knowledge may likewise be circumstantial.
- A district court’s conditional grant of a new trial under Rule 33 is reviewed for abuse of discretion and may rest on the court’s weighing of evidence and credibility, which differs from the Rule 29 sufficiency inquiry.

## Conclusion

The court of appeals held that the evidence permitted a rational jury to convict Campbell of money laundering and engaging in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property, so the judgment of acquittal was reversed; however, the district court’s conditional new-trial order was affirmed and the case remanded.


United States v. Campbell, 977 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1992)