## Facts

- Ronald Mark Chapman was subject to a domestic violence protective order (DVPO) protecting a former intimate partner and effective from November 3, 2009, to May 3, 2010.
- The DVPO reflected a judicial finding that Chapman likely committed domestic abuse and included a finding that he posed a credible threat to an intimate partner’s physical safety.
- The DVPO expressly prohibited Chapman from possessing firearms and ammunition during its term and warned that federal law barred such possession.
- On December 28, 2009, police responded to a 911 call reporting shots fired at the residence of Chapman’s ex-wife, where Chapman was living.
- Shortly before the call, Chapman’s ex-wife found him in a bedroom with a handgun; he said he planned to kill himself, and two shots were fired into a wall during a struggle.
- Chapman then obtained additional firearms; after the ex-wife fled, a shot was fired out of a window in her direction.
- Officers arrested Chapman and, while securing the home, located six firearms and 991 rounds of ammunition.

## Issues

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), as applied to Chapman, violated the Second Amendment by prohibiting firearm possession while he was subject to a qualifying DVPO.

## Decision

- The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Chapman’s motion to dismiss and affirmed his conviction.
- The court assumed (without deciding) that § 922(g)(8) burdens Second Amendment-protected conduct and proceeded to evaluate constitutionality under scrutiny.
- The court applied intermediate scrutiny because the disarmament is temporary and limited to individuals subject to DVPOs issued with procedural protections and danger-related findings.
- The court held the government has a substantial interest in reducing domestic gun violence and protecting victims of domestic abuse.
- The court concluded § 922(g)(8) is reasonably adapted to that interest because it is time-limited and applies only when a DVPO includes notice and an opportunity to participate and specified findings or force-prohibiting terms.
- As applied, Chapman fell within the statute’s targeted class: he was under a qualifying DVPO, possessed multiple firearms and extensive ammunition, and his conduct during the DVPO period confirmed heightened domestic-risk concerns.

## Legal Principles

- Courts may use a two-step Second Amendment framework: (1) determine whether the law implicates conduct within the Amendment’s historical scope, and (2) if so, apply an appropriate level of scrutiny.
- Intermediate scrutiny applies to firearm restrictions that do not destroy the core right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to possess firearms for self-defense, particularly where the restriction is temporary and directed at persons judicially found to present domestic-violence-related risk.
- Under intermediate scrutiny, the government must show the regulation is reasonably adapted to a substantial governmental interest.
- 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) satisfies intermediate scrutiny because it is limited to persons subject to qualifying DVPOs issued with due process protections and containing specific danger-related findings or explicit force-related prohibitions, and it lasts only while the order remains in effect.
- An as-applied Second Amendment challenge fails where the defendant is within the statute’s intended reach and the record supports the domestic-violence risk the statute addresses.

## Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit upheld § 922(g)(8) as constitutionally applied to Chapman, holding that temporarily disarming individuals subject to qualifying domestic violence protective orders is substantially related to the government’s interest in preventing domestic gun violence and protecting abuse victims.


United States v. Chapman, 666 F.3d 220 (4th Cir. 2012)