## Facts

- In 1996, Daniel Edward Chovan was convicted in California state court of misdemeanor inflicting corporal injury on a spouse, Cal. Penal Code § 273.5(a).
- He received a sentence of 120 days in jail and three years of supervised release.
- California law imposed a time-limited firearms disability, while federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), bars firearm possession by persons convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.”
- In 2010, federal agents found Chovan in possession of firearms, and he was indicted in the Southern District of California for violating § 922(g)(9).
- The district court denied Chovan’s motion to dismiss the indictment; Chovan entered a conditional guilty plea preserving appellate review of that denial.

## Issues

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) is unconstitutional on its face under the Second Amendment.
2. Whether § 922(g)(9) is unconstitutional as applied to Chovan.
3. Whether Chovan fell outside § 922(g)(9) because his “civil rights” had been restored within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii).

## Decision

- The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and upheld Chovan’s conviction.
- The court applied a two-step Second Amendment framework: (1) whether the law burdens protected conduct; and (2) if so, what level of scrutiny applies.
- The court held that intermediate scrutiny governed because the statute does not severely burden the Second Amendment’s core protection for law-abiding, responsible citizens in defense of the home.
- Under intermediate scrutiny, the court held § 922(g)(9) substantially related to an important governmental objective—reducing domestic gun violence—and rejected both facial and as-applied challenges.
- The court rejected Chovan’s “civil rights restored” defense because he did not show loss and restoration of core civil rights (voting, jury service, holding office) as required by § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii).

## Legal Principles

- Second Amendment challenges in the Ninth Circuit use a two-step inquiry: determine whether the law burdens protected conduct, then apply an appropriate level of scrutiny based on the severity of the burden and proximity to the Amendment’s core.
- Intermediate scrutiny applies to firearm restrictions that do not severely burden the core right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to possess firearms for self-defense in the home.
- Under intermediate scrutiny, the government must show the law is substantially related to an important governmental interest; preventing domestic firearm violence qualifies as such an interest.
- A status-based firearms prohibition tied to a domestic-violence misdemeanor conviction can satisfy intermediate scrutiny where the conviction functions as an objective proxy for dangerousness and federal law provides limited statutory relief mechanisms.
- For purposes of § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii), “civil rights restored” refers to restoration of core political rights (typically voting, holding office, and jury service); a time-limited state firearms restriction, without qualifying loss and restoration of those rights, does not remove a conviction from § 922(g)(9).

## Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit upheld 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) under intermediate scrutiny, rejecting both facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges and holding that Chovan did not qualify for the “civil rights restored” exception, so his domestic-violence misdemeanor conviction supported the federal firearms ban.


United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013)