## Facts

- Benjamin Drake Daley, Michael Paul Miselis, and Thomas Walter Gillen were members of the Rise Above Movement (RAM), described in the indictment as a militant white-supremacist group whose members trained in combat and traveled to political demonstrations.
- Between March and August 2017, RAM members traveled to and attended multiple rallies and demonstrations, including events in Huntington Beach (March 2017), Berkeley (April 2017), and the “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville (August 2017).
- The superseding indictment alleged that RAM members prepared for violence (including by training for hand-to-hand fighting), coordinated their attendance at events where clashes were anticipated, and used online platforms to publicize and celebrate violent encounters.
- The indictment alleged that, at the listed events, RAM members engaged in assaults and intimidation, including punching, kicking, choking, head-butting, and related acts against counter-protesters and others.
- The government charged the defendants with (1) conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 to violate the Federal Anti-Riot Act and (2) substantive violations of the Anti-Riot Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2101.
- Section 2101 ties liability to interstate travel (or use of an interstate or foreign commerce facility) with specified riot-related intent and requires an overt act in furtherance of that intent. Section 2102 defines “riot” as a public disturbance involving acts or threats of violence by one or more persons as part of a group of at least three, creating a clear and present danger of (or resulting in) injury or property damage.
- Before trial, the defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing (among other things) that Wharton’s Rule barred the conspiracy count because “riot” involves group conduct, and that the Anti-Riot Act and/or indictment were legally defective.

## Issues

1. Whether Wharton’s Rule bars charging a conspiracy to violate the Anti-Riot Act on the theory that a “riot” requires multiple participants.
2. Whether the Anti-Riot Act is facially overbroad under the First Amendment because it reaches protected speech or advocacy.
3. Whether the Anti-Riot Act is void for vagueness under the Due Process Clause.
4. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 2101 exceeds Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.
5. Whether the indictment adequately alleged the elements of the charged conspiracy and substantive Anti-Riot Act offenses and provided sufficient notice.

## Decision

- The court denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss.
- The court held that Wharton’s Rule did not bar the § 371 conspiracy charge based on an object offense under § 2101.
- The court rejected the defendants’ constitutional challenges to the Anti-Riot Act (including First Amendment overbreadth, vagueness, and Commerce Clause arguments).
- The court held the superseding indictment sufficiently alleged the essential elements and enough factual detail to inform the defendants of the charges and protect against double jeopardy.

## Legal Principles

- Wharton’s Rule is a narrow presumption of statutory interpretation, not a constitutional limit; it generally does not apply when the substantive offense can be committed by a single actor or when the charged agreement involves more participants or harms than the minimum needed to commit the substantive offense.
- The Anti-Riot Act’s interstate-travel (or interstate-facility) requirement and its specific-intent plus overt-act structure narrow the statute’s reach and support treating it as aimed at riot-related violence and unprotected incitement rather than abstract advocacy.
- A criminal statute is not unconstitutionally vague when its terms, read in context and alongside intent and overt-act requirements, give ordinary people fair notice and provide workable standards that limit arbitrary enforcement.
- Congress may regulate the channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce; a statute that attaches liability only when a defendant travels interstate (or uses interstate facilities) with the required intent falls within that authority even if the anticipated violence occurs locally.
- An indictment is sufficient when it states the offense’s elements, identifies the statutory basis, and includes enough factual context—such as time frames, locations, and alleged acts—to allow defense preparation and to permit a later plea of former jeopardy.

## Conclusion

United States v. Daley upheld the continued prosecution of RAM members charged with conspiring to violate, and violating, the Federal Anti-Riot Act based on alleged coordinated travel to political events and ensuing violence; the district court denied dismissal, concluding that Wharton’s Rule did not bar the conspiracy count, the Anti-Riot Act survived the asserted constitutional attacks, and the indictment provided adequate notice of the charged conduct.


United States v. Daley, 378 F. Supp. 3d 539 (2019)