## Facts

- Maurice Lamont Davis and Andre Levon Glover participated in a series of Texas gas-station robberies.
- A jury convicted them of Hobbs Act robbery and conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery.
- The jury also convicted them under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for brandishing firearms during a “crime of violence,” producing enhanced consecutive sentences.
- One § 924(c) conviction depended on treating Hobbs Act conspiracy as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause.
- After an initial affirmance, the case returned to the court of appeals on remand, which held § 924(c)(3)(B) unconstitutional and vacated the § 924(c) conviction tied to the residual clause.
- The government sought review, urging a conduct-based (“case-specific”) construction to avoid invalidating the residual clause.

## Issues

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause when applied through the categorical “ordinary case” approach.
2. Whether the statute should be construed to require a conduct-based (“case-specific”) inquiry into the defendant’s actual actions, rather than a categorical analysis of the offense in the abstract.

## Decision

- In a 5–4 opinion by Justice Gorsuch, the Court held § 924(c)(3)(B) void for vagueness.
- The Court concluded the residual clause, as written and traditionally applied, requires a categorical “ordinary case” assessment that yields unpredictability and arbitrary enforcement.
- The Court rejected the government’s proposed case-specific construction as inconsistent with the statute’s text, structure, and settled judicial interpretation, and as beyond the proper use of constitutional avoidance.
- Disposition: affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded; the § 924(c) conviction resting on the residual clause could not stand, while § 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause remained operative.

## Legal Principles

- A vague criminal law violates due process by failing to provide fair notice and by inviting arbitrary enforcement.
- A residual “crime of violence” definition that requires courts to imagine an offense’s “ordinary case” and then estimate an indeterminate level of risk is unconstitutionally vague.
- Courts may not rewrite a criminal statute under constitutional avoidance where the proposed narrowing construction lacks a textual basis and would materially change the statutory inquiry.
- Invalidating § 924(c)(3)(B) does not affect § 924(c)(3)(A); firearm penalties under § 924(c) remain available when the predicate offense satisfies the elements clause.

## Conclusion

The Court held that § 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause is void for vagueness because it demands a categorical “ordinary case” risk inquiry without clear standards, and it refused to adopt a conduct-based interpretation not supported by the statutory text; the case was remanded after vacating the § 924(c) conviction dependent on the residual clause.


United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019)