## Facts

- Lawrence T. Day and Eric J. Sheffey were indicted in a 17-count case arising from events on Dec. 14–17, 1976, including a stolen-vehicle offense, armed robbery and assaults, firearms offenses involving sawed-off shotguns, and the murder of Gregory Williams.
- The district court severed counts 1–8 (stolen vehicle, robbery, assaults) from counts 9–17 (sawed-off shotguns and the Williams homicide).
- In the first trial on counts 1–8, Day pleaded guilty to several counts; Sheffey was acquitted on all counts.
- Before the second trial on counts 9–17, the government sought to admit (1) evidence of conduct charged in counts 1–8 as other-acts evidence and (2) testimony from Kerry Mason about statements Williams made shortly before his death.
- The government proffered that minutes before Williams was killed, he gave Mason a note reading “Beanny, Eric 635-3135,” and told Mason that Day and Sheffey had argued with him about “stolen guns and coats,” were “out to get” him, and that if Williams did not come home the next day Mason should call police and provide the phone number.
- The district court excluded Mason’s testimony as hearsay and categorically barred the government from using evidence of the earlier crimes at the second trial.
- The government took an interlocutory appeal challenging these evidentiary rulings.

## Issues

1. Whether Williams’s statements and the note, as related by Mason, were inadmissible hearsay or admissible for limited non-truth purposes (including state of mind and contextual linkage).
2. Whether the district court erred by categorically excluding all evidence of other crimes from counts 1–8 at the second trial, instead of applying Rules 404(b) and 403 to specific items of evidence.

## Decision

- The D.C. Circuit reversed the evidentiary exclusions and remanded.
- The court held the district court took an overly broad view of hearsay by excluding Mason’s proffer wholesale without separating truth-purpose use from admissible non-truth uses (including state-of-mind and contextual evidence).
- The court held the district court abused its discretion by imposing a blanket bar on other-acts evidence; it was required to evaluate admissibility under Rule 404(b) and then conduct a Rule 403 balancing on an item-by-item basis, with consideration of limiting instructions.
- A dissent would have been more deferential to the trial court and expressed concern that jurors would treat the victim’s statements as substantive proof despite limiting instructions.

## Legal Principles

- A statement is hearsay only when offered to prove the truth of what it asserts; statements may be admissible when offered to show that words were spoken, to explain subsequent conduct, to show the declarant’s state of mind, or to supply relevant context, subject to limiting instructions.
- Trial courts should distinguish among (1) physical or verbal acts (such as giving a note and issuing instructions), (2) statements offered for non-truth purposes, and (3) narrative assertions offered for their truth.
- Other-acts evidence may be admissible for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b) (e.g., motive, intent, identity, plan, knowledge) and is not subject to categorical exclusion.
- Under Rule 403, relevant evidence should be excluded only when its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice; close cases generally favor admission, often with limiting instructions to reduce misuse by the jury.

## Conclusion

The D.C. Circuit required the district court to reassess the victim’s pre-death communications for permissible nonhearsay uses and to reconsider other-acts evidence through a specific Rule 404(b) analysis and Rule 403 balancing rather than blanket exclusion, with limiting instructions where appropriate.


United States v. Day, 591 F.2d 861 (D.C. Cir. 1978)