United States v. Dewitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41 (1869)

Facts

  • Dewitt was indicted in the U.S. Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Michigan under § 29 of the Internal Revenue Act of Mar. 2, 1867.
  • The indictment alleged that Dewitt offered for sale in Detroit petroleum-based illuminating oil that was inflammable below the statutory fire-test of 110°F.
  • The indictment did not allege tax evasion, nonpayment, or any revenue-related violation; it alleged only that the sale was “contrary to law.”
  • Dewitt demurred, and the circuit judges certified questions to the Supreme Court after dividing on the statute’s constitutionality and whether the charged facts stated a federal offense.

Issues

  1. Whether Congress had constitutional authority to prohibit and criminally punish purely intrastate sales of petroleum-based illuminating oil failing the 110°F fire-test.
  2. Whether § 29 of the 1867 Act was a valid exercise of federal power (including taxing, commerce, or necessary-and-proper authority) when applied within a state.
  3. Whether the indictment stated an offense under any valid federal law.

Decision

  • The Court held that § 29, as applied to Dewitt’s alleged conduct, was not a valid constitutional law of the United States.
  • The Court characterized § 29 as a police regulation directed to public safety in internal state trade, not as a measure enforcing federal taxation.
  • Because Congress lacks a general police power within state territory, the statute could not constitutionally operate on a purely intrastate sale in Michigan.
  • The Court concluded the facts alleged did not constitute an offense under any valid federal law, so the indictment could not stand.
  • Congress has no general police power to regulate the internal trade and business of the states; federal criminal prohibitions must be anchored in an enumerated power.
  • A statute placed in a revenue act is not sustained by the taxing power when, as applied, it operates as a safety regulation without a meaningful nexus to tax assessment or tax enforcement.
  • The Commerce Clause does not authorize federal regulation of purely intrastate trade merely because the subject matter affects public safety; absent a valid enumerated-power basis, such regulation remains for state law.
  • A regulation of this type may operate only where Congress has exclusive legislative authority (e.g., the District of Columbia), not within state limits.

Conclusion

The Court invalidated § 29 as applied to an intrastate sale of low fire-test illuminating oil in Michigan, holding that Congress could not impose a general public-safety criminal rule within a state without a sufficient connection to an enumerated federal power.