## Facts

- Kentucky National Guard officers, including Robert DeZarn, helped plan a May 19, 1990 “Preakness Party” at Billy Wellman’s home to raise funds for Brereton Jones’s gubernatorial campaign.
- The 1990 event drew about sixty guests; Jones spoke briefly; campaign contributions were collected. DeZarn admitted receiving contributions there, and witnesses testified they gave him checks and saw checks being counted.
- In June 1991, Wellman hosted a small dinner gathering (six attendees) that was not a fundraiser and involved no campaign contributions.
- After Jones became governor and appointed DeZarn Adjutant General, complaints to the Army Inspector General (IG) alleged Guard personnel decisions were tied to campaign support, including fundraising at the Preakness Party.
- During a sworn IG interview, the investigator asked DeZarn about a “Preakness Party in 1991.” DeZarn stated it was not political fundraising, he could not recall whether Jones attended, and he did not know of or see contributions made there.
- DeZarn was indicted for perjury under 18 U.S.C. § 1621 based on those sworn statements; a jury convicted him, and he received 15 months’ imprisonment, a $5,000 fine, and a two-level obstruction-of-justice enhancement.

## Issues

1. Whether § 1621 perjury can be based on answers to questioning that included an imprecise or mistaken premise (the year), where the evidence allowed the jury to find the witness understood the true subject of the inquiry and answered falsely.
2. Whether the “literal truth” doctrine precludes perjury liability when a defendant claims his answers were true only if the question is read to refer to a different event than the one reasonably understood in context.
3. Whether the challenged statements were material to the IG investigation.
4. Whether refusal to give a “two-witness rule” jury instruction required reversal.
5. Whether the obstruction-of-justice sentencing enhancement was properly applied.

## Decision

- The Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence.
- The court held a defendant may be convicted of perjury if a jury can find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew what the question meant and gave knowingly untruthful and materially misleading answers, even if the question contained an imprecise detail such as an incorrect date.
- The court concluded the evidence permitted the jury to find DeZarn understood the questioning to concern the 1990 fundraising Preakness Party and that his sworn denials were false.
- The court upheld materiality because the statements concerned whether fundraising occurred and thus could influence the IG’s inquiry into politically motivated pressure or retaliation.
- The court found no reversible error in declining a two-witness-rule instruction given the corroborated evidentiary record.
- The court affirmed the obstruction-of-justice enhancement.

## Legal Principles

- Perjury under 18 U.S.C. § 1621 turns on whether the witness knowingly made a false statement under oath that was material to the proceeding.
- In assessing falsity where questioning is imprecise, the factfinder may consider the context and the witness’s knowledge and reasonable understanding of what the question sought.
- The “literal truth” doctrine does not bar conviction where “truth” depends on exploiting an obvious mistake in the question despite a shared contextual understanding of the subject being asked about.
- A statement is material if it is capable of influencing the decisionmaking body or investigation, even if it does not actually do so.
- A two-witness-rule instruction is not required where the proof of falsity is supported by corroborating evidence beyond a single uncorroborated witness.

## Conclusion

The court sustained a perjury conviction where the questioned date was mistaken but the context supported a finding that the defendant understood the inquiry’s true subject and responded with materially false, misleading testimony, and it affirmed both the verdict and the obstruction-related sentence enhancement.


United States v. DeZarn, 157 F.3d 1042 (6th Cir. 1998)