## Facts

- Stefan Dimitrov operated a money-transmitting service in Chicago that sent customer funds to Bulgaria for a fee.
- He used bank accounts, including an account styled “B Connection,” to wire funds abroad.
- Dimitrov did not hold an Illinois money-transmitter license, though he had a City of Chicago business license.
- Federal agents investigated and charged him with operating an unlicensed money transmitting business under 18 U.S.C. § 1960(a).
- Dimitrov entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to challenge the statute’s constitutionality and an evidentiary ruling excluding proof that he lacked knowledge of the Illinois licensing requirement.
- The district court sentenced him to three months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release.

## Issues

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 1960(a), which permits conviction for operating without a required state license “whether or not the defendant knew” a license was required, violates due process by imposing unconstitutional strict liability or failing to provide fair notice.
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by excluding evidence that Dimitrov did not know Illinois required a money-transmitter license.

## Decision

- The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence.
- Section 1960(a) is constitutional even though it eliminates a requirement that the defendant know a state license is required.
- The statute retains a mens rea element: the defendant must knowingly conduct a money-transmitting business.
- The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the government’s motion in limine because Dimitrov’s ignorance of the state licensing requirement was irrelevant under § 1960.

## Legal Principles

- Under 18 U.S.C. § 1960(a) and (b)(1)(A), the government must prove the defendant knowingly operated a money-transmitting business, but need not prove the defendant knew a state license was required.
- Congress may, consistent with due process, omit a knowledge-of-law element in regulated, potentially harmful commercial activity where actors are on notice to determine applicable licensing requirements.
- A statute’s explicit statement that liability attaches “whether or not” the defendant knew of the licensing requirement provides clear notice of the element structure and defeats a fair-notice challenge premised on ignorance of the law.
- Evidence offered solely to support a legally invalid defense is irrelevant and may be excluded to prevent confusion and unnecessary litigation of non-elements.

## Conclusion

The court upheld § 1960’s post-amendment framework as a permissible regulatory crime: it criminalizes the knowing operation of a money-transmitting business that lacks a required state license, without requiring proof that the operator knew the licensing rule, and it affirmed exclusion of ignorance-of-licensing evidence as irrelevant.


United States v. Dimitrov, 546 F.3d 409 (7th Cir. 2008)