## Facts

- S.A. Healy Co. served as the employer on a Milwaukee tunnel construction project; Patrick J. Doig was the tunnel project manager.
- On November 10, 1988, a tunnel explosion killed three Healy employees.
- A federal grand jury indicted Healy and Doig on twelve counts of criminal OSHA violations under 29 U.S.C. § 666(e), which criminalizes an employer’s willful OSHA violation causing an employee’s death.
- The indictment treated Healy as the “employer” and charged Doig—who was not alleged to be an employer or corporate officer—with aiding and abetting Healy’s violations under 18 U.S.C. § 2.
- The alleged violations concerned, among other things, ventilation, safety training, explosion-proof electrical equipment, and electrical power shutoff during a gas encounter; the government tied Doig to the explosion-proof equipment and power-shutoff failures.
- The district court dismissed the charges against Doig on the ground that § 666(e) reaches only “employers,” not employees, including via aiding-and-abetting.
- Healy was separately tried and convicted on all counts; the government appealed only the dismissal of Doig’s indictment.

## Issues

1. Whether a non-employer employee may be prosecuted under 29 U.S.C. § 666(e) for a willful OSHA violation causing death, either directly or through 18 U.S.C. § 2 aiding-and-abetting liability.
2. Whether applying aiding-and-abetting doctrine to § 666(e) would impermissibly expand a statute that limits criminal liability to “any employer.”

## Decision

- The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the indictment against Doig.
- The court held that Congress limited § 666(e) criminal liability to employers and did not authorize criminal prosecution of non-employer employees, even as aiders and abettors.
- The court concluded that using 18 U.S.C. § 2 to reach employees would conflict with OSHA’s statutory allocation of responsibility for workplace safety to employers.

## Legal Principles

- When a criminal statute specifies a limited class of liable actors, general aiding-and-abetting liability does not extend criminal punishment beyond that class absent congressional intent.
- OSHA § 666(e) imposes criminal penalties on “any employer” whose willful violation causes an employee’s death; that text and OSHA’s structure reflect an intent to place primary criminal responsibility on employers.
- An employer may be held responsible for violations committed through its agents, but that imputation of liability to the employer is distinct from imposing direct criminal liability on the non-employer employee.

## Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit held that OSHA’s criminal provision for willful, fatal violations applies only to employers and cannot be expanded through aiding-and-abetting doctrine to prosecute a non-employer employee such as a project manager, so the dismissal of Doig’s indictment was properly affirmed.


United States v. Doig, 950 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1991)