## Facts

- After a high-speed chase, Billy Randall Stinnett surrendered and was handcuffed.
- The government’s evidence indicated that, once Stinnett was handcuffed and no longer resisting, Eaton and other deputies severely beat him in a sally port area, implicating a possible federal civil-rights offense.
- The FBI opened an investigation and requested written reports describing events “before, during, and after” the arrest.
- Two deputies (Adam Minor and Steve Runyon) testified that Eaton instructed them to submit false reports claiming Stinnett continued resisting after being handcuffed and pulled a knife on Eaton.
- Minor and Runyon further testified that Eaton reviewed draft reports and added false details to Minor’s report before it was submitted to federal authorities.
- The deputies later admitted their earlier accounts were false and stated Eaton used his supervisory authority to pressure them to maintain the false narrative as the federal investigation progressed.

## Issues

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove Eaton knowingly and corruptly attempted to hinder communication of information to federal law enforcement under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3), where key witnesses had previously lied.
2. Whether false statements about pre-handcuff events could constitute information “relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense” when the suspected federal offense was excessive force after handcuffing.
3. Whether the district court plainly erred by not instructing the jury on the § 1512(e) affirmative defense.
4. Whether the district court erred by not giving a special unanimity instruction for the witness-tampering counts.

## Decision

- The Sixth Circuit affirmed Eaton’s two convictions for witness tampering under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3).
- The court held the jury could credit Minor’s and Runyon’s trial testimony despite their prior false statements; credibility disputes were for the jury and the testimony was not incredible as a matter of law.
- The court held that Eaton’s efforts to procure and maintain false reports could be found to have the intent to hinder, delay, or prevent communication to federal officers of information relating to a possible federal offense.
- The court interpreted “relating to” broadly; false statements about the chase and alleged resistance could affect assessment of whether later force was excessive and thus related to the possible federal offense.
- Reviewing for plain error, the court found no basis for a § 1512(e) instruction because the record did not support a claim that Eaton’s conduct was intended to encourage truthful information.
- The court found no error in the absence of a special unanimity instruction because the counts and instructions sufficiently focused on discrete misconduct and there was no genuine risk of a non-unanimous verdict.

## Legal Principles

- A § 1512(b)(3) conviction may rest on testimony from witnesses who previously lied if the testimony is not incredible as a matter of law; assessing credibility and weight is the jury’s function.
- Under § 1512(b)(3), information “relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense” includes contextual information that could bear on whether the federal offense occurred (including whether force was justified).
- Directing subordinates to submit false reports to federal investigators, editing reports to add false details, and pressuring witnesses to maintain false statements can constitute “corrupt” attempts to hinder communication to federal law enforcement under § 1512(b)(3).
- The § 1512(e) affirmative defense is unavailable where the evidence shows the defendant’s purpose was to cause false, not truthful, information to be provided.
- A special unanimity instruction is not required absent a genuine risk that jurors may convict without agreeing on the same factual basis for a count.

## Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed Eaton’s § 1512(b)(3) convictions, holding that the jury could rely on cooperating witnesses who had previously lied, that false accounts of events preceding the alleged excessive-force incident could still “relate to” a possible federal civil-rights offense, and that the challenged jury-instruction omissions did not amount to reversible error.


United States v. Eaton, 784 F.3d 298 (6th Cir. 2015)