## Facts

- Arturo Esparza lived in Tijuana, Mexico, and traveled to San Diego to visit his children.
- Esparza attempted to enter the United States at the San Ysidro port of entry driving a 1999 Chevy Lumina.
- Border officers searched the vehicle after a narcotics dog alert and found over 50 kilograms of marijuana concealed in the gas tank and dashboard.
- The Lumina was registered to Diana Hernandez at the time of the seizure.
- After being notified by law enforcement that the car had been seized for drug smuggling, Hernandez filed a California DMV “Notice of Transfer and Release of Liability” stating she had sold the car to Esparza six days before his arrest.
- At Esparza’s trial for importing marijuana, the only contested issue was whether he knew the car contained marijuana; the government sought to infer knowledge from ownership.
- The government did not call Hernandez to testify (though she was available at the courthouse) and instead introduced the DMV document and a CBP report repeating Hernandez’s ownership assertion.
- Esparza objected on hearsay and Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause grounds; the district court admitted the documents, and Esparza was convicted.

## Issues

1. Whether Hernandez’s out-of-court ownership statement, placed in DMV and CBP records after notice of a law-enforcement drug seizure, was “testimonial” under the Sixth Amendment.
2. Whether admitting that statement without producing Hernandez for cross-examination violated the Confrontation Clause.
3. If a violation occurred, whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

## Decision

- The Ninth Circuit held that Hernandez’s statement was testimonial because an objective person in her position would reasonably foresee use of the statement in a criminal prosecution, particularly given the law-enforcement seizure context and incentive to shift blame.
- The court held that admitting the statement without Hernandez’s testimony (and without any prior cross-examination opportunity) violated the Confrontation Clause.
- Applying Chapman harmless-error review, the court concluded the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the government relied heavily on the statement to prove the central disputed point (ownership as proof of knowledge).
- The court vacated Esparza’s conviction and remanded for further proceedings.

## Legal Principles

- A private declarant’s statement can be “testimonial” even if contained within a government or business record; the relevant inquiry is the statement’s objective primary purpose and surrounding circumstances.
- Where a statement is made after law-enforcement action and under circumstances suggesting anticipated criminal use (including incentives to deflect culpability), it may fall within the core class of testimonial statements barred by Crawford absent cross-examination.
- The Confrontation Clause prohibits admitting testimonial hearsay against a criminal defendant unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.
- Confrontation Clause violations are reviewed for harmlessness under Chapman; an error is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when the inadmissible testimonial statement is central to proving a contested element and materially shapes the case.

## Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit vacated Esparza’s marijuana-importation conviction because the government used a testimonial DMV ownership statement to prove knowledge without calling the declarant for cross-examination, and the resulting Confrontation Clause error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.


United States v. Esparza, 791 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2015)