## Facts

- Federal narcotics charges arose from an undercover operation in the Bronx involving attempted heroin transactions and subsequent arrests.
- Charles Estepa and Francis Vasquez were tried in a bench trial in the Southern District of New York and convicted on four counts of heroin distribution, possession with intent to distribute, and conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841, 846.
- The only grand-jury witness was a New York City police officer (Twohill), who provided a detailed narrative of key events.
- Twohill conceded he could not see the actual drug transaction at the final meeting he observed.
- Large portions of Twohill’s testimony described conversations and events he did not personally observe or participate in and were based on what others told him.
- The prosecutor did not clearly inform the grand jury that significant parts of the testimony were hearsay, leaving the impression the witness had firsthand knowledge.
- Eyewitnesses (including the undercover officer and other participating agents) were readily available but were not presented to the grand jury.

## Issues

1. Whether an indictment must be dismissed when the government relies substantially on hearsay before the grand jury, fails to disclose it as hearsay, and thereby misleads the grand jury despite the availability of direct eyewitness testimony.

## Decision

- The Second Circuit reversed the convictions.
- The court ordered the indictment dismissed due to the manner in which the case was presented to the grand jury.
- The court held that, although hearsay is not categorically barred in grand-jury proceedings, the government’s use of it here improperly misled the grand jury and impaired its screening function.
- The court acted under its supervisory authority over federal criminal procedure, rather than announcing a constitutional rule.

## Legal Principles

- An indictment may rest on hearsay, but the government may not present hearsay in a way that misleads the grand jury into believing the testimony is based on personal knowledge.
- When eyewitness testimony is readily available, heavy reliance on a single “summary” witness’s hearsay account, without clear disclosure of its hearsay character, can warrant dismissal in the Second Circuit.
- Dismissal is an appropriate remedy where the defect concerns the grand jury’s ability to make an independent charging decision, not merely an evidentiary error at trial.

## Conclusion

The Second Circuit required dismissal of the indictment because the government presented a largely hearsay narrative through a sole officer-witness without making clear that key assertions were not based on firsthand knowledge, even though direct eyewitnesses were available, thereby misleading the grand jury and compromising its independent role.


United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1972)