## Facts

- Feola and confederates arranged a sham heroin sale in a New York City apartment, intending to deliver powdered sugar and, if challenged, assault the buyers and steal their money.
- The buyers were undercover federal narcotics agents, a fact unknown to the defendants.
- During the transaction, the agents became suspicious; an altercation occurred and the defendants attempted to assault the agents before additional agents intervened and arrests followed.
- The defendants were charged with assaulting federal officers in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111 and conspiring to commit that assault in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.
- The trial court instructed the jury that conviction on either count did not require proof that defendants knew their victims were federal officers; the jury convicted on both counts.
- The Second Circuit affirmed the § 111 convictions but reversed the § 371 conspiracy convictions for lack of a knowledge-of-status instruction; the Supreme Court granted review.

## Issues

1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 111 requires proof that the defendant knew the person assaulted was a federal officer.
2. Whether, even if § 111 does not require such knowledge, a conspiracy to violate § 111 under 18 U.S.C. § 371 requires proof that conspirators knew the intended victim was a federal officer.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and reinstated the conspiracy convictions.
- For § 111, the Court held the government must prove intent to assault, but need not prove knowledge of the victim’s federal status.
- For § 371 conspiracy to violate § 111, the Court held the government likewise need not prove knowledge of the victim’s federal status where that fact is not an element requiring mens rea in the substantive offense.
- The Court rejected the Second Circuit’s reliance on a rule that conspiracy requires knowledge of jurisdictional facts not required for the substantive crime.

## Legal Principles

- Under 18 U.S.C. § 111, the victim’s federal status is a jurisdictional element; the required mental state is intent to commit the assault, not intent to assault a federal officer.
- When a substantive federal offense does not require knowledge of a jurisdictional fact, conspiracy to commit that offense under 18 U.S.C. § 371 does not add a knowledge requirement as to that jurisdictional fact.
- Conspiracy liability generally tracks the mental state required for the substantive offense; ignorance of a jurisdictional fact does not reduce the danger posed by an agreement to commit independently wrongful conduct.

## Conclusion

United States v. Feola held that assaulting a federal officer under § 111 requires intent to assault but not knowledge that the victim is a federal officer, and that the same rule applies to conspiracy to commit that assault under § 371, reinstating the conspiracy convictions.


United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975)